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I. INTRODUCTION 
tudies of economic development and poverty reduction have recently focused on and 
are linked to education or the accumulation of human capital (Heyneman and Stern, 
2015). Development perspectives on education cover not only expanding enrollment 
rates but also alleviating gaps and inequalities in educational attainment across social groups, 
both domestically and internationally. Those gaps are largely associated with the extent to 
which students themselves engage in activities that prepare them for learning. Hence, it is 
straightforward to assume that schoolchildren who face obstacles to spending time learning 
and reviewing schoolwork at home as well as at school are more likely to perform poorly. 
This is also likely to increase the frequency of dropouts (Randall and Anderson eds., 1999). 
Among these obstacles, poverty or other financial constraints would, theoretically, be one of 
the most critical. Poverty can be a chronic problem even after children are successfully 
enrolled in schools. Therefore, it is insufficient to look only at enrollment status as a predictor 
of educational outcomes in developing and emerging economies, including the Philippines 
(Torres, 2011), the focus of our research.  
 This study begins by examining a gender disparity in human capital formation, 
“boys’ underperformance in education” (UNGEI, 2012) or “boys’ crisis” (Miralao, 2008). In 
contrast to the majority of developing countries, certain developing countries such as the 
Philippines, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
been experiencing gender disparity in education that is unfavorable for male children 
(Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2009; Randall and Anderson, 1999; Torres, 2011; UNGEI, 2012; 
Zimmermann and Williams, 2016). Although enrollment rates in elementary education in 
the Philippines are almost gender-equal, or only slightly favor females, the rates for 
secondary education show a clear gender gap that is unfavorable to males. The Philippines 
stands out among other developing regions in terms of its high (greater than 1.0) gender 
parity index (GPI). The GPI in the Philippines is considerably higher than in other 
developing countries and is not limited to basic education but extends to higher levels of 
education in the country (Miralao, 2008; Yamauchi and Tiongco, 2013). The same tendency 
is observed not only for school enrollment rates in the Philippines but also in the degree of 
illiteracy and low level of educational attainment; furthermore, it has been reported that 
there are more males than females among the country’s out-of-school youths and children 
(OOSY/C).1  
 This gender gap in the Philippines has been expanding inter-generationally. 2 
                                                     
1 See Appendix Figure A- 1 and Appendix Figure A- 2. Likewise, the same gender gap is also observed in 
the educational performance measured as the school report-card scores of the sampled children in the 
current study’s primary data. See Appendix Table A- 3. 
2 See Appendix Figure A- 3: For the age cohort 60–64 (the oldest generation in the sample), the GPIs of both 
levels were the same; from the oldest generation, the GPI of “level 4” increases over succeeding generations 
up to 1.3 for the youngest generation in the sample; in contrast, the GPI of “level 0” decreases over 
generations from oldest to youngest, to around 0.5 for the youngest generation. In other words, (i) 1.3 times 
as many women obtained a level of literacy equivalent to at least a graduate of secondary education as their 
male counterparts but (ii) twice as many men attained the lowest literacy level compared to their female 
counterparts. 
S 
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Gender disparity is smallest among older generations and has increased among younger 
generations, so although a reverse gender gap may seem to be a recent phenomenon, gender 
disparity for education in the Philippines is actually quite persistent and is definitely not 
new. Despite its persistence, this issue has been studied far less than more conventional 
topics. 
 There is even a notion that female children are seen as more adaptable or suitable 
to school culture than male children (Torres, 2011; UNGEI, 2012).3 Comments made by local 
adult representatives during interviews conducted for this research portrayed boys as “lazier” 
and girls as “more diligent.” There is, however, still much room for quantifying this issue. 
This study conducted a time-allocation survey for children, conducted together with a 
general household survey. As with conventional economic concerns regarding intra-
household gender biases, this study is likewise concerned with differences that may exist 
regarding children’s time-allocation patterns, their magnitude, and the circumstances under 
which the differences are gender dependent (Deaton, 1997: 223); this last issue is the specific 
focus of this study.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a literature 
review and explains our analytical framework. Section III explains the data and methods 
used to conduct our time-allocation survey. Section IV discusses our empirical analysis and 
models. Section V provides the results, while Section VI adds further issues to consider. 
Finally, Section VII concludes. 
 
II. MOTIVATIONS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study is motivated by an interest in reaffirming the primary role children play in 
investing in their own human capital, and as the originators of that human capital. The 
interconnections among learning, working, and leisure are the focus of the child time-use 
survey used in this study. In particular, leisure is given special attention as a limitation as 
described in previous literature. Finally, the impact of mothers’ labor force participation 
(MLFP) on their child time allocations is also of interest; its asymmetric effect on sons and 
daughters is given special attention. 
 
A. Reaffirmation of the Prime-Player Role of Children as Learners 
 Although human capital investment has been included in households’ decision- 
making, there has been a theoretical notion that children are not prime players in this process 
(Deaton, 1997: chap. 4). According to this line of thought, families are controlled or governed 
by adults and thus children are not vital members of their families. This notion has been 
predominant in development studies and been an (implicit) assumption not only behind the 
unitary model but also behind the collective model in the economics of the family (Browning 
                                                     
3 In advanced economies, studies of labor economics have come to focus not on the level of education but 
on the type (contents) of education, or the academic specialty, as women’s goal of having access to higher 
education and gender equality in the quantitative sense has largely been achieved. Therefore, in developed 
countries, if there are differences in the latter spheres in education between men and women, the wage gaps 
between men and women become even more difficult to understand than before (O’Reilly et al., 2015; 
Rubery and Grimshaw, 2015; ILO, 2016). 
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et al., 2014; Eswaran, 2014). More recent studies have emphasized how children’s roles are 
exercised within the family. For example, Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) and Attanasio and 
Kaufmann (2010) found that in developing countries, not only parents but also children form 
their subjective expectations regarding gains from the children’s education in the current 
school term. They advocated that expectations of both children and adults be used as 
predictors of children’s attendance in senior high schools and enrollment in colleges. This 
reaffirms the youths’ commitments to the decision-making process for their own education. 
While parents have expectations, children have their own expectations and they behave 
based on these expectations when deciding on their level of educational investment.  
 Children’s own behavioral patterns are therefore the focus of our interest, such that 
these patterns can, in turn, form the basis for parents’ decision-making. This is thus a 
motivation to analyze children’s behaviors as measured by their time-allocation patterns, 
where we assume those behaviors can be converted into tangible time-allocation patterns. 
 
B. Time Availability of Children in Learning, Working, and Leisure 
1. Child labor–education tradeoff 
One of the characteristics that distinguish developing countries from developed 
countries is that in developing countries, children can be engaged in a considerable degree 
of labor activities that compete with education for their time. Working children are found 
nationwide in the Philippines, and boys are more often reported to be engaged in labor 
activities than girls (Alegado, 2012). It is fairly common for children to be thought of not only 
as learners who attend school but also part of the labor force, particularly as they become 
physically mature. Here child labor can broadly include compensated work outside the 
home as well as unpaid domestic work within households.4 The latter is relatively more 
common among female children. 
It is theoretically safe to assume that working children sacrifice a certain amount of 
the time they spend engaged in labor at the expense of schooling activities. Child labor and 
education are thus thought to be in a substitutive relationship in a microeconomic sense, and 
child labor can be demanded and provoked by a household’s economic circumstances. 
Psacharopoulos (1997) highlighted that child labor is associated with a reduction in 
schooling while contributing significantly to household income. Focusing on the former 
channel, Heady (2003) found a negative relationship between child labor and educational 
attainment measured by abilities in reading and mathematics in a study of Ghanaian 
schoolchildren. Likewise, Beegle et al. (2009) showed the negative consequence of child labor 
on the child laborers’ enrollment status and test scores after five years, using national data 
from Vietnam. The majority of the literature supports the negative consequences of child 
labor on education, or the intuitive child labor–education tradeoff (Patrinos and 
                                                     
4 Indeed, during the author’s fieldwork at the research site, a considerable number of school youths were 
observed engaging in various types of labor where the child’s age was questionable. Some youths helped 
their fathers repair tricycles; worked in operations in water stations; stripped the skins off of coconuts and 
split them; minded the sari-sari store (family-owned small shops selling daily consumables in small 
amounts); fished together with their fathers; and did household chores such as washing clothes and dishes, 
sewing, cleaning, arranging furniture and surroundings, and babysitting their younger siblings. They 
reported that some jobs provided some compensation and others were unpaid. The former seems to apply 
to labor done in the market (outside the home), while the latter is domestic work. 
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Psacharopoulos, 1997). 
In contrast, Ravallion and Wodon (2000) made a distinctive contribution to the 
literature by finding a weakness in the view of a substitutive relationship between child labor 
and education in a developing country setting using Bangladeshi data. Their study showed 
that school stipends, which were even less than the mean wages of child laborers, increased 
children’s school attendance but did not proportionally decrease the time spent in child labor. 
In other words, an increase in the amount of time spent on education did not systematically 
lead to a decrease in the time spent working. Using data from rural northern India, Fuwa et 
al. (2006) presented similar evidence that the factors determining child labor and school 
enrollment were not clearly inversely correlated. In this sense, they supported the findings 
of Ravallion and Wodon (2000), emphasizing that education and child labor are unclear 
substitutes in poverty settings. Kurosaki et al. (2006) also support these findings, providing 
robustness to this view.  
The imperfect nature of the substitutive relationship between education and labor 
for children in terms of time allocation cannot be that surprising when we consider that a 
child’s time is allocated not just to education and child labor but also to other activities. Fuwa 
et al. (2006) mentioned the necessity for future studies to examine leisure time in the 
analytical framework of time-allocation studies. In this regard, aside from the economic 
context, sociologists also pay special attention to time allocations for leisure (Jacobs et al., 
2004). Nevertheless, a literature review of developing countries by Lloyd et al. (2008) finds 
that relevant studies focused on the leisure time of youths has thus far been limited (Lloyd 
et al., 2008: 102–103). 
 
2. The Philippines setting 
 The issue of schoolchildren engaged in labor is highly relevant to the issue of boys’ 
basic education in the Philippines (Alegado, 2012). In the Philippines, child labor occurs 
more in rural areas than in urban centers, and economically, it occurs more in poor 
households than in rich ones (Okabe, 2019b: 14; 194). Poor households in rural areas are more 
likely to face demands for labor and it is not unusual for children to find opportunities to 
work in fields growing crops. Studies of the Philippines formalized an idea that Filipino boys 
are demanded to join the labor force at a younger age than their female counterparts while 
they are of school age, particularly in rural settings; many of these boys cannot manage 
working and studying at the same time and therefore they can lag behind their female 
counterparts in education (Estudillo et al., 2001a; Estudillo et al., 2001b; Quismbing, 1994).  
 Male children’s comparative advantage in finding more working opportunities 
earlier in a rural setting, even during the course of their schooling, is justified by their 
physical development in terms of muscle strength developed in adolescence, which is 
compatible with the need for farming and field labor (Alesina et al., 2013).5 Furthermore, 
this physical labor-related perspective is theoretically consistent with assumptions that, on 
the one hand, the demands for cash and the time-discount rates of the poor are high and, on 
                                                     
5 Ravallion and Wodon’s study of Bangladesh also found that having more working-age men in households 
reduced the probability of a child being forced into child labor. It suggests a scarcity leading to a “greater 
pressure for boys to earn income in families where there are fewer adult male earners” (Ravallion and 
Wodon, 2000: C172). 
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the other hand, the marginal utility of short-term immediate contributions to household 
livelihoods is larger than from the long-term, uncertain benefits of investments in human 
capital.6 If the aforementioned findings in South Asia are applicable to other regions as well 
as the Philippines, the previously formalized idea in the rural Philippines can still be an open 
question. It is necessary to study child time-allocation patterns that incorporate leisure time, 
as has already been emphasized. For these reasons, the current study chooses to analyze 
time-allocation patterns as an appropriate approach to studying this issue. 
 
C. Working Mothers, Child Education, and Family Dynamics 
 Female labor force participation has been growing in some developing East Asia 
and Pacific region countries (Cameron et al., 2001). However, that is not yet a universal 
tendency in all of the countries in the region; therefore, it has been difficult for researchers to 
investigate the effect of parental work on children’s education and welfare that may differ 
depending on the gender of the parents, and also of the children in developing countries 
(Antman, 2012: 296). Despite this, increasing female labor force participation in some regions 
has enabled academic research investigating these effects. Where female labor force 
participation is growing, not only are more unmarried women working but also more 
mothers are going to work. In general, MLFP is considered one of means by which 
households cope with shocks and fluctuations in their financial condition, and/or to address 
additional financial demands, outside of motives related to women’s voluntary decisions or 
preferences to work.  
 In spite of this, it is still controversial and disputable as to whether MLFP positively 
contributes to child welfare in terms of education based on the additional income MFLP 
generates, since maternal work is observed less often than paternal work (Antman, 2012).7 
Afridi et al. (2016) presents evidence of a positive effect of MLFP on children’s schooling in 
India even after accounting for the income effect brought about by MLFP; the authors 
interpreted it in the context of working mothers gaining a greater voice and influence in their 
households that in turn led to positive consequences on children’s education. In contrast, 
negative consequences of MLFP on child labor are also found by research that shows MLFP 
lead to an increase in child labor in Bolivia, Columbia, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Philippines 
(Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; Grootaert and Patrinos, 2002) and also in India (Sawada et al., 
2006).  
                                                     
6  Aside from this micro perspective, more structural and historical perspectives are relevant. Social 
movements for women in the Philippines increased during the late 20th century, in response to which more 
human-right protections for women were institutionally and legally established at the national level, such 
as the 1989 Republic Act (RA) 6725 (anti-discrimination law for women) and the 2010 RA 9710 (Magna Carta 
of Women). The concepts of American democracy and Catholic equalitarianism rooted in the Philippines 
are exceptional among developing countries, which has achieved high rankings among Asian countries in 
internationally comparable gender equality rankings. These appear to form a persuasive framework to 
explain why the Philippines is achieving greater gender equality. Yet, while higher gender equality would 
suggest that gender disparities are shrinking in the educational sphere, it does not explain why a male 
gender gap in education still persists. In other words, a certain equalization principle is not a sufficient 
explanatory framework for another disproportion principle. Our motivation here is to explore this problem 
more deeply. 
7 Antman (2012: 296) also reviews that, in this situation, the Philippines is an exceptional case with greater 
female labor force participation observed, an example of which is a study by Cortes (2015). 
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 Considering that the education–labor nexus may differ depending on a child’s 
gender also gets our attention because female children in developing countries have been 
shown to suffer a negative effect from MLFP (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995). For instance, 
Sawada et al. (2006) found that child labor among daughters is more likely to be triggered 
by their mothers entering the labor force, as the daughters took over the mothers’ roles in 
domestic work. It is consistent with the general tendency in developing countries that female 
children that are forced to quit schooling to participate in the wage labor force to help boost 
their household incomes or to play a surrogate role for their mothers while the mothers work 
outside the home (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995: 192; Strauss and Thomas, 1995: 1990). It has 
also been reported that younger siblings’ education comes at the expense of their elder sisters’ 
exits from education (Parish and Willis, 1993). 
 Among various forms of parental work, overseas work is expected to significantly 
benefit the income of the families left behind in their home countries, particularly if those 
countries are developing economies and the countries where the overseas work is located 
are developed economies. Despite this, literature finds unfavorable consequences of that 
type of work on child welfare. For example, Cortes (2015) examined the consequences of 
parents working abroad on the educational attainment of their children who remained in the 
Philippines. One research focus has been the impact on parental time availability with their 
children.  
 Parental labor force participation has different effects regardless of whether the 
work is overseas or domestic; namely, a wealth effect and a time effect. The former is 
presumed to be positive to child welfare and education while the latter is assumed to be 
negative, because working parents cannot avoid reducing the amount of time available to 
spend with their children at home. Yet, only the former was conventionally looked upon as 
affecting a child’s education (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995: 192). In contrast, Cortes (2015) 
presents evidence of a negative effect of mothers working abroad, showing it causes their 
children to lag behind in terms of their level in school, i.e., it is associated with a gap between 
their actual and expected level calculated by their ages and the schooling system. This is 
consistent with a more casual finding in the Philippines by Battistella and Conacothe (1998), 
showing that parents’ working abroad is not detrimental for children’s development and 
education as long as the mothers remain in their home. Findings in psycho-social research 
showing a greater demand from male children for parental involvement during their 
juvenile years are also relevant (Bertrand and Pan, 2013).8   
 Despite these research findings, the relationship between gender and the effect of 
parental work on child welfare and education is ambiguous, and thus, there are open 
questions to be resolved. For example in China, it is reported that parental work has a 
negative effect on girls’ education (Meyerhoefer and Chen, 2011). For Latin America, Acosta 
(2011) shows that the effect of parents working overseas is not gender neutral for children 
pursuing an education in El Salvador; when mothers work overseas, female children benefit 
from remittances that increase school attendance and allow them to pursue tertiary 
education but male children do not. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) finds the effect of 
                                                     
8 Bertrand and Pan (2013) focus on the tendency of male children to engage in more disruptive, aggressive 
and delinquent behaviors. According to their study, in the United States, the family environment is found 
to be more influential for boys’ mental development than the school environment, and male children are 
more sensitive and responsive to the inputs of their parents than their female counterparts. 
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parental work overseas differs between sons and daughters’ education in Mexico but there 
is little conclusive evidence to evaluate how positive or negative the effect is. In sum, gender 
heterogeneity between parental work and child welfare is not predictable a priori across 
regions and countries. Still, these studies shed light on the relationship between gender and 
the effects of parental inputs and involvement needed for children’s welfare and 
development (Nguyen, 2016). 
 
D. Analytical Framework 
 By combining the aforementioned discussions, the current study hypothesizes that 
male children’s use of time and the patterns of that usage are influenced by their mothers’ 
participation in the labor force through a channel of the home time available to mothers and 
their sons, and the mothers’ monitoring power over sons. In addition, the relative balance 
matters to those mothers who also have daughters. This hypothesis is examined by analyzing 
the time-allocation pattern described in the following sections. The Philippines is unique or 
unusual compared to its counterparts in South Asia or the Middle East, for example, in that 
female labor force participation has not been resisted culturally (Antman, 2012; Fuwa et al., 
2006; Takahashi, 1972). Some initial conditions in the Philippines have been found by rural 
studies, which have led to this lack of resistance to female labor.  
 Although Filipino women are treated indifferently than men, while men exercise 
authority and power inside the families, women are not necessarily weaker than their 
husbands; for example, women usually control the purse strings (Takahashi, 1972: 159). 
According to observations made as early as the 1960s, Filipino women have been referred to 
as being among those who are best able to participate in the labor force in Asia, enabled by 
less cultural and mental resistance in the country (Takahashi, 1972).9,10  
 
= Figure 1 around here = 
 
 Therefore, one important research question is what the consequences are with 
respect to child education as predicted by children’s time-allocation patterns if their mothers 
participate in the labor force. These consequences, which are still an open question in the 
development literature, are of interest for both academics and policymakers. Note that MLFP 
in the current study is mainly concerned with domestic, local employment, which is still 
considered to be universal and widely observed in rural and poor regions. Despite this, less 
has been analyzed about local work compared to the cases of parental overseas work, the 
frequencies of which differ depending on whether the family lives in a geographically and 
socioeconomically disadvantaged rural area to move to overseas work (cf. Appendix Table 
                                                     
9 Yet, in varying degrees, there is an equivocal aspect when it comes to female labor. Recent studies report 
that Filipino female workers are still not treated and compensated as favorably as men in the labor market, 
even if the females strive for the attributes and equivalent qualifications that men have (Asuncion, 2018; 
Serrano and Certeza, 2014; Yamauchi and Tiongco, 2013). 
10 Indeed, according to the nationally representative statistics, the female labor force participation rate is 
particularly higher in MIMAROPA Region (Region IV-B), where the rural research site is located, than the 
national average (Figure 1). 
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A- 1). In contrast, domestic employment is significant in poor regions.11  
 Also note that working mothers in our research site are qualitatively different from 
not only mothers working abroad but also middle-class working mothers in urban centers 
within the Philippines who can work by hiring so-called “yaya” (babysitters and “maids”) as 
substitutes in the childcare sphere. In rural areas, MLFP is usually triggered by poverty. 
While relying heavily on provisions from the government, the rural poor face demands to 
maintain even a subsistence level of existence. In this sense, the situation of the rural poor is 
an extreme and unwanted condition, rather than a reaction to what Illich referred to as the 
“radical monopoly” that covers contemporary technological urban centers (Illich, 2001). 
 
III. DATA COLLECTION AND SURVEY METHODS 
A. Research Site and Sampling 
This study uses data the author gathered in Marinduque Province in the Philippines, 
using a tailored household questionnaire survey. The author visited the province a number 
of times, engaging in fieldwork activities to prepare for the household survey beginning in 
August 2017. After several visits through December in 2017, the author surveyed around 300 
children from 150 households through March 2018 including a pilot survey (dry run) 
conducted between the end of December 2017 and mid-January 2018. The sample 
households were selected using the stratified random sampling method from nine sampled 
barangays (the smallest local government unit in the Philippines) in the three selected 
municipalities in the province in the MIMAROPA Region in the Philippines (see Figure 2 for 
the location of Marinduque Province). Marinduque Province was chosen because it has one 
of the highest educational gender disparities in the Philippines, with males underperforming 
(see a companion paper, Okabe 2019a, for details). 
 
= Figure 2 around here = 
 
B. Collected Information 
 The intensive survey collected information in the following four categories: (1) 
individual characteristics of the sampled children; (2) schooling and educational profiles of 
the children; (3) basic information about the household; and (4) time allocations of two 
selected children per household, primarily those who are high school aged. The questions 
for categories (1), (2), and (4) were asked directly to the children whereas the questions for 
category (3) were directed to a parent or grandparent (adult guardian). In a few cases where 
parents were not available at the time of our survey visitations, relatives (uncles, aunts, or 
grandparents) or adult siblings responded on behalf of the parents.  
 Category (1), children’s characteristics, is a set of information that includes names, 
gender, birthday, birth order among siblings, and number of siblings. Category (2) includes 
either enrollment status and school-related information if the responding children are 
                                                     
11 Domestic employment, rather than overseas work, is dominant in our research site’s regional setting (see 
Appendix Table A- 1 to look at MIMAROPA Region). The qualifications and hurdles required for those who 
want to work overseas are still highly selective and difficult for workers in the region to overcome. 
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enrolled in school or the reasons for quitting schooling if the respondents are not enrolled in 
school. For category (3), basic household information, we collected demographic, 
educational, employment, and earning information for the parents or guardians, including 
home addresses. The description for category (4) is given in the next subsection.  
 
C. Time-Allocation Survey 
1. Survey designs 
 Time allocation with respect to work (paid, voluntary, and unpaid [care] work) has 
been a central topic in the literature of time-allocation studies (Chen et al., 2005: 24; Dong 
and An, 2015: 547; Esquivel et al., 2015: 107). This is reflected in the motivation of achieving 
recognition of the value of women’s work from an economic perspective, in recalculating, 
reevaluating, and imputing value to unpaid and domestic work mainly contributed by adult 
women, into the system of national accounts. Time-use surveys for juveniles are still quite 
limited. In addition, designing and conducting time-use surveys in developing countries is 
not as easy as in developed countries (Esquivel et al., 2015); hence, the limited use of time-
use surveys involving adolescent juveniles in developing countries is pronounced (Lloyd et 
al., 2008). 
 There are some exceptions. In examining the relationship between mother’s labor 
and child labor under credit constraints in rural India, Sawada et al. (2006) used the “one 
week time-use module” to collect time-use information over a seven-day period prior to the 
interview date. Bouis et al. (1998), in analyzing the contributions of adolescents to household 
livelihoods, employed a retrospective method wherein selected adolescents in the surveyed 
barangays in a rural Philippines, Bukidnon Province, were asked to recall their time use for 
the past week. However, leisure time allocations were not explicitly surveyed in these 
studies (as discussed in subsection B-1, section II).  
 Certainly, the reference periods used in most surveys have been in the past 
(Esquivel et al., 2008; Lloyd et al., 2008), including studies done in developing countries 
(Esquivel et al., 2008: 145–152). However, this study considers a sort of recall bias that 
includes the potential for a respondent to unconsciously change his or her answer(s) for fear 
that the responses would be exposed to and identified by somebody else, such as their 
parents. Such a bias could be crucial in cases where a respondent would feel at risk of being 
judged on a normative or ethical basis if the time allocated to a certain activity that the 
respondent believes would be seen as a good (bad) deed might possibly be over-reported 
(under-reported). 
 One way to deal with this potential bias is to collect data in a forward-looking way. 
The current survey design takes its cue from Kudo et al. (2019);12 thus, our survey design 
pays attention to the following issues. First, it focuses explicitly on such leisure activities as 
playing. In addition, time spent in computer-game shops is also included here as a reflection 
                                                     
12 Actually, this refers to the World Bank Economic Review’s preprinted version in 2017 of Kudo et al. (2019). 
Their study measured the impact of providing solar-lanterns on students’ academic performance in rural 
Bangladesh, where time-use information was collected in a forward-looking way: They gave students diaries 
and asked them to complete them every day so the information would be fresh, rather than relying on their 
memories. 
 11 
 
of the situation in today’s Philippines, as Filipino youths commonly go to such shops to surf 
the Internet and play online games. Second, our design avoids using a retrospective 
approach because respondents may not be confident in remembering and recalling how they 
spent their time, even just a few days ago. Third, the collected time- allocation information 
is not discrete or categorical as has been the convention; the data is numerically continuous 
for more efficient use in statistical or econometric analyses. 
 The survey instructions included the following steps. 13  First, diary-type 
questionnaire sheets were distributed to the respondents and it was explained to each 
respondent through both a written form and an oral orientation that this researcher simply 
wanted to know their ordinary time uses. In the instructions, the author emphasized to them 
that all personal information and any of their responses would be immediately coded into 
numerical and anonymous information and that no one could discover the identity of the 
respondents. Second, we directly collected completed documents from the respondents 
without showing them to their parents or reading through them. Third, the importance of 
honest answers was also explained to their parents/guardians and they were urged never to 
look at or censor the questionnaire sheets that the children were keeping. Finally, it was 
emphasized both to the respondents and their parents/guardians that it would not matter at 
all whether they were–––or pretended to be–––devoted to the family, diligent, studious, or 
hard-working, since we as researchers were not their educators, supervisors, or authority 
figures. Lastly, two siblings were sampled per household to take advantage of their mutual 
monitoring, in case incorrect or exaggerated responses were reported by one of them. 
 
2. Collected information on child time allocations 
 The information on time allocations includes education-related time, working time, 
and leisure (home) time along with unstructured time. The leisure (home) category includes 
time spent playing outside with friends or playing computer games in computer shops. 
Theoretically, leisure time can be divided into two categories: unstructured and structured 
activities (Lam and McHale, 2015). Combining these classifications with the observations 
gathered from the author’s pilot survey activities, the questionnaire was set as semi-
structured with some free descriptions.  
 The questionnaire was self-administered, and hence, the author prepared all parts 
in the questionnaire sheets in Tagalog, the mother tongue of the locals. The respondents were 
asked if they had already finished school as of the survey date or would have exams in the 
current semester and if so, they were asked for the exam date. The regression analyses 
contain information on whether the survey respondents were expected to have term exams 
and how many days remained until the exam date to control for this factor in educational 
time usage. After collecting the completed questionnaires after seven days or later, the author 
checked to see if there were unclear or inconsistent responses that required changes. 
Depending on the lack of clarity, the case respondents were asked to report their answers 
again by mobile phone or were interviewed again in person in an attempt to assure the 
quality of answers.  
 
                                                     
13  Although not an interventional study, these steps simultaneously attempt to mitigate the exposure 
suspicion bias and the Hawthorne effect.  
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IV. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
A. Time-Allocation Function 
 Obviously, every individual 𝑖𝑖 faces the same daily time constraint, denoted as 𝑇𝑇 
(equals to 24 hours), in allocating her or his time to various activities. Denoting the time 
allocated to 𝑎𝑎 types of activity set 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎, there are 𝑎𝑎 different activity classifications, and the 
time constraint is expressed by the relationship in Eq. (1): 
 
 �𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇,                 where  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 > 0. (1) 
 
 In Eq. (1), the residual term 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 represents unstructured “inactive” or “idle” time 
with which individuals are not consciously cognizant of what they are formally doing. It is 
assumed that every individual has at least some 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 (therefore, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 > 0). In contrast, a certain 
𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖 can be zero, depending on 𝑖𝑖’s attributes (e.g., youths who have quit school allocate no 
time to schooling). Recalling the points stated by Ravallion and Wodon (2000), Fuwa et al. 
(2006), and Kurosaki et al. (2006), we explicitly extract leisure activities from the term 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, as 
leisure used to be included in 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖  in the literature. Individuals thus face a tradeoff in 
allocating time to each activity under the time constraint represented as Eq. (1).  
 
B. System of Equation Model 
 The time-allocation model for an activity 𝑘𝑘(∈ 𝐴𝐴) is expressed as 
 
 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐱𝐱𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒌𝒌 + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. (2) 
 
where the vector 𝐱𝐱𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  comprise the individual- and household-level characteristics 
(including the individual’s gender indicator and its interaction terms with other covariates), 
where one variable of interest, the MLFP indicator, is included; 𝜔𝜔 is the controlling effect 
for unobserved heterogeneity as discussed later; and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the stochastic error term, all 
regarding an individual 𝑖𝑖 from a household 𝑗𝑗. 
 An empirical issue is that, as shown by Eq. (1), individuals’ time is not allocated to 
education, for example, independently from other activities. Rather, time is allocated in 
relationship to other activities. In this sense, a single-equation approach to estimating each 
“time-use” function does not precisely consider the interdependency of the system of 
equations because ordinary estimations such as OLS hypothesize the error terms are 
uncorrelated with each other. This issue has already been recognized in the time-use 
literature. In this setting, the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach, which is 
classified as a system of equations model (Srinivasan and Bhat, 2005; Don and An, 2015), is 
an appropriate estimation method. The model is transcribed as shown in Eq. (3), where, 
unlike the OLS model, we relax the model so that the covariances of error terms can be 
nonzero, and are jointly estimated allowing Cov(𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘,𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙) ≠ 0,∀𝑘𝑘, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐴𝐴, 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑙𝑙  (Wooldridge, 
2002: chap. 7): 
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⎩
⎨
⎧
𝑡𝑡1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐱𝐱𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝟏𝟏 + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑢𝑢1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,
𝑡𝑡2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐱𝐱𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝟐𝟐 + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑢𝑢2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,
⋮
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐱𝐱𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒂𝒂 + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (3) 
 
C. Endogeneity Concern and Instrument Variable Approach 
 In estimating the MLFP effect on child time allocations in the SUR model shown in 
Eq. (3), we must consider the possibility that the assumed exogeneity of the variable MLFP 
is violated. Conceptually, in a similar manner to what has been addressed in migration 
studies (Antman, 2013: 293–294), in the link between the determinants of MLFP and child 
time uses, it is possible that endogeneity may take the form of reverse causation. For instance, 
if a child spends more time helping with household chores, it may be easier for the mother 
to work outside the home. Similarly, if a mother is working, her child may allocate more time 
to playing outside or less time to studying because the child perceives that the mother is less 
able to monitor him or her. In other words, MLFP, the independent variable, may both 
explain and be explained by children’s time uses, the dependent variables, to some degree. 
If this is the case, a causal relationship cannot be precisely identified unless the endogeneity 
is addressed. To do so, this study employs the instrumental variable (IV) approach. 
 In the IV approach, ideally the instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction. Namely, 
the instrument should be a determinant of MLFP but should correlate indirectly with the 
child’s time allocation only through the channel of MLFP. As such, this study exploits the 
individual-level wage-trend information from the labor market for the occupations of 
mothers, for mothers know whether the recent wage trend is favorable, unfavorable, or 
indifferent for them. The trend, if favorable (unfavorable), is believed to encourage the 
mothers to (not to) join the labor force or for currently working mothers to (not to) continue 
working.  
However, as the instrument, this information is not directly correlated with the 
children’s time-allocation decisions. In this sense, this study assumes that short-term wage-
trend information is used in the mother’s decision-making process regarding whether or not 
to participate in the labor force but such short-term information does not directly change a 
child’s preferences regarding time-use except via the MLFP status of the child’s mother. 
Certainly, if the wage-trend information were collected on a long-term or dynamic basis, 
some children might perceive this information as a factor that encouraged (did not 
encourage) them to study while at home and to stay in school, for example. However, the 
assumption in the current analysis relies on the fact that the wage-trend information is short 
term. In addition, in such a short term as one to two years, no general equilibrium effect of 
their individual-level labor force participation on those wage trends is assumed. 
 This wage-trend information for mothers was gathered in the household 
questionnaire surveys. This indicator shows whether the wage trend has been increasing in 
the past two years for their occupations. If interviewees were working when they were 
interviewed, this trend information was asked regarding their specific occupations; if they 
were not working, this trend information was asked regarding the occupation that she was 
most likely to engage in if she started to work now. Although approximately half of the 
mothers in the sample were not in the labor force when they were interviewed, a 
considerable number of them reported that they could choose specific occupations if they 
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were to start working soon.14 This may reflect that they had worked previously or that they 
had recently exited from the labor force for some external reason. Note that this information 
was not about abstract and general female labor markets but was about specific occupations 
in which they were currently or most likely to be engaged. The endogeneity test and weak 
instrument test are described in the estimation section.  
 Therefore, the SUR model is extended to a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model 
with the instrumental variable (Wooldridge, 2002: chap. 7). The 3SLS is an extended 
application of SUR to deal with endogenous regressors that are included in the system of 
equations using the instrument(s). The 3SLS models are estimated by the full-information 
maximum likelihood method and do not explicitly present test statistics for the validity of 
instruments. Thus, test statistics to assess the validity of the instrument is based on 2SLS 
estimators that are reported in subsection D in section VI to show the results of the 
endogeneity test and the weak instrument test.  
 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
A. Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
for two sub-samples.15 The systems-of-equation estimations are performed separately on 
these sub-samples for robustness checks and comparisons. One sub-sample includes all of 
the children regardless of their school enrollment status (the “Full Sample”) and the other is 
restricted to enrolled children whose educational achievement scores were collected (the 
“Enrolled Sample”). Thus, the Full Sample includes children not enrolled in school or so-
called OOSY/C. This division into two sub-samples is applied hereafter to other estimations 
as well. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
 The dependent variables are the child’s weekly time allocations for sleeping, 
studying at home, schooling, working, playing, and using computer-game shops. In the 
Enrolled Sample, the average time allocated to education-related activities increases and the 
average time allocated to leisurely activities decreases compared to the Full Sample. 
Interestingly, even in the “Enrolled Sample,” the average time allocated to child labor as to 
helping with their mothers’ jobs increases slightly, while the average time allocated to 
household chores remains almost the same. This indicates that regardless of enrollment 
status, children are expected to commit to household chores or to help with their mothers to 
a certain degree. 
 The independent variables are classified into three categories: (i) individual child 
                                                     
14 This instrument is made possible by a characteristic of the Philippines discussed in subsection C, section 
II; namely, that female labor force participation is high compared to more male-dominated developing 
countries where females are likely to be discriminated against and have difficulty choosing to work. 
15 Appendix Table A- 2 shows the gender differences for the dependent variables. 
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characteristics; (ii) household characteristics; and (iii) school-related variables.16 In the Full 
Sample, 91% of children are enrolled in school and the remaining 9% are OOSY or non-
enrolled children, of whom there are comparably more males (41.2% vs. 45.8%). In both 
samples, the mean age is around 15, which meets the survey’s intent to concentrate mainly 
on high-school-age children. The indicator of “low aspirations child” means the parental 
aspiration for the child’s education is below the college level, which is the default aspiration. 
In the Full Sample, 9.5% of the children have parents who aspire for them to complete only 
the secondary education level or even lower, but in the Enrolled Sample that decreased to 
5.0%. Among demographic information (birth orders and number of siblings), the number 
of siblings averages five to six, including the respondent. It is apparent that there is little 
difference in the demographic characteristics between the Full and Enrolled samples. 
 The summary statistics for MLFP indicator show that on average, half of the 
respondent mothers are working. Additional information on the occupation categories is 
provided. For the reference category “contract workers,” two dummy variables are used: 
farmers (landowners) at 1%, and self-employed at 35%–38%. Household monthly income, in 
log form, is based on a six-month average. The amounts include earnings of fathers and 
mothers if working and contributions from other members if any (e.g., remittances by their 
children living independently elsewhere).17  
 The fathers and mothers in the sample are in their mid-forties, on average. Mothers 
are slightly more likely to have completed a tertiary level of education than fathers. The 
percentage of fathers who completed a tertiary level education is 10%–12% compared to 14% 
for mothers. Most heads of household are men (96%–97%), indicating that the breadwinner 
role belongs predominantly to men.18 In around 13% and 9%–10% of the households, fathers 
and mothers are reported to not be living together with other family members, respectively. 
 Regarding children enrolled in school, their school information was used as 
independent variables only in the “Enrolled Sample” (“n.a.” in the “Full Sample”) in Table 
1. Among the children enrolled in school, 90% go to public schools. Regarding the 
commuting modes, 20% walk to school, which means that 80% use some means of 
transportation (e.g., tricycles or jeepneys). As a factor in a child’s time allocations, the survey 
asked about the house-to-school distance. On average, schools are located 3.6 kilometers 
from the home but there is a high standard deviation around this average, depending on the 
educational level in which children are enrolled. As of the date of the first time-allocation 
survey, schoolchildren had 42 days remaining until their exams, on average. 
 
B. Child Individual Characteristics 
 The 3SLS estimations are performed separately on the two sub-samples, “Full” and 
“Enrolled,” to allow for a robustness check. Table 2 presents the results for the Full Sample, 
so we need to control for the school enrollment indicator because it is expected to largely 
explain the variances in schooling and learning time allocations. The OOSC/OOSY and non-
                                                     
16 The third, school-related covariates are included in regression analyses to control for the school-related 
variations, the detail interpretation is given in APPENDIX B (page 57) due to a space constraint. 
17  The remittance share in the total household income is, on average 13.5%. If this share is high, the 
breadwinner roles of the father and/or mother in that household livelihood are likely to be unstable since 
they are more dependent upon a third-channel remittance. 
18 For a description of why the “breadwinner” role is attributed to fathers, see the Conclusion, section VII. 
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enrolled children are also more likely to be engaging in labor (helping with their fathers’ 
jobs) and household chores and to have more leisure time than the enrolled children. Given 
this variation, we first consider the characteristics for each specification for the Full Sample 
[1] in Table 2. The estimated results show the following tendencies, ceteris paribus.  
 Male children spend less time on schooling, studying at home, and helping with 
household chores but spend more time in leisure activities, both playing outside and in 
computer-game shops, and in child labor helping with their fathers’ jobs compared to their 
female counterparts. Female children are more likely to spend their time on what we define 
as “pro-educational” activities and helping with household chores than their male 
counterparts. In contrast, male children are more likely to engage in child labor activities, 
particularly in their fathers’ jobs, and to spend more time in leisure activities and less time 
studying at home than their female counterparts, which we define as a less pro-educational 
pattern.19 In helping with their mothers’ jobs, no significant gender difference is detected. 
Older children are likely to stay in school for less time and/or to engage in labor (helping 
with fathers’ jobs) longer than their younger counterparts. Birth-order information alone 
predicts that older siblings are more likely to spend a longer time studying at home than 
their later birth-order counterparts.  
 Moreover, according to the results shown in Table 3 for the Enrolled sample, the 
number of siblings is a statistically positive predictor of the percentage of time a child 
allocates to studying at home. Based on this, there may be a positive externality among 
siblings for time spent studying, and it is possible that having older siblings triggers this 
externality. As for the low parental aspirations, this is not robust in either Table 2 or Table 3; 
however, the male children for whom the parents have a relatively low level of educational 
aspiration tend to play longer than others. 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 around here 
 
C. Household Characteristics 
 Table 2 and Table 3 show that household income levels are positively associated 
with children’s pro-educational time allocations, i.e., studying at home and schooling. 20 
Whereas the household income alone is a positive predictor for children to engage in pro-
educational activities, the share of income represented by remittances contributed by other 
family members negatively predicts the time allocated to those activities. This indicates that 
while income by itself is a positive predictor for children to spend more time engaged in pro-
educational activities, this is attenuated when the household income level is not sustained 
by the fathers (and mothers) as the prime breadwinners (see also the footnote 17, p. 15).  
                                                     
19 Regarding students’ educational attainment measured by the scores achieved in school subjects (shown 
in Appendix Table A- 3), Appendix Table A- 4 shows the results of a multiple regression analysis to find 
partial correlations using time allocations as independent variables. It reveals that only three uses of time 
have partial correlations with school performance: studying at home (positive), child labor helping with 
their fathers’ jobs (negative), and leisurely time playing (negative). Appendix Figure A- 4 visualizes a 
schematic of the time allocations as predictors of educational attainment and their interrelations based on 
Appendix Table A- 3, Appendix Table A- 4, and Appendix Table A- 5. 
20 At the same time, according to Table 2, household income levels positively predict computer-game shop 
usage, which is not surprising because patrons are required to pay the shops a usage fee. 
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 Of particular concern is the MLFP effect on children’s time allocations. First, 
according to Table 2, the analyses that combine all respondents without the interaction terms 
show that the overall effect of MLFP is to increase the time children spend in pro-educational 
activities (both studying at home and schooling) compared to children whose mothers do 
not participate in the labor force. MLFP also reduces the time children spend on leisure 
activities (both playing and computer-game shop use). These results suggest that the effect 
of MLFP is pro-educational for children. 
 Notwithstanding the overall pro-educational effect of MLFP, the analyses that 
include the interaction terms with the child’s gender shows the heterogeneity of the MLFP 
effect based on gender. The estimators in the specifications [2] for each dependent variable 
in Table 2 show the MLFP effect reduces sons’ studying time at home but increases both the 
sons’ labor time in their mothers’ jobs and time spent in leisure activities (both playing and 
computer-game shop use). The daughters’ responses are qualitatively the reverse of their 
male siblings’ responses, according to the mathematical signs of estimators. In Table 3 (the 
Enrolled Sample) the effect of MLFP in increasing sons’ labor time persists despite the fact 
that children who do not have education-related time are excluded from this sample, and 
the same is seen for playing time. It is also noteworthy that the effect of fathers’ labor force 
participation (FLFP) is much less explanatory for the use of children’s time than the effect of 
MLFP and that the effect of FLFP is homogeneous with respect to a child’s gender. 
 
D. Further Explorations for the MLFP Effect 
 To further explore the MLFP effects, mothers’ employment-status indicators are 
also included. According to the questionnaire responses, the majority of working mothers 
are self-employed (69.4%), followed by contract workers 21  at 27.8%, and land-owning 
famers (called ”magsasakang may lupa” in Tagalog) at 1.4% in a dramatic decrease. 
Accordingly, “self-employed” and “land-owning farmer” indicators (dummy variables)22 
are created to include in the regression equations as “contract workers” is made the reference 
category. Hence, the coefficients of these indicators are interpreted as additional effects to 
the effect of MLFP.23 
 In Table 2, the mathematical signs of the “self-employed” indicator are opposite of 
those of the MLFP.24 This indicates that children whose mothers are self-employed decrease 
their pro-educational time and increase the amount of their time spent on labor (mothers’ 
jobs) and leisure (both playing and computer-game shop use) compared to children whose 
mothers are more formal workers. Moreover, in contrast to the effect of MLFP alone, the 
aforementioned additional effects from the category of “self-employed” imply that effects of 
miscellaneous or less formal types of work are homogenous as to the child’s gender because 
                                                     
21 This is considered more formal than self-employment. 
22 The sample does not include sons whose mothers work as land-owning farmers; thus the interaction term 
with child = male indicator is not estimated. 
23 Letting MLFP, self-employee, and land-owning-farmer indicators be denoted as 𝑀𝑀 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , and 
their coeffieicents be 𝜇𝜇1, 𝜇𝜇2, and 𝜇𝜇3, the contract-worker effect is expressed as 𝜇𝜇1𝑀𝑀 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜇𝜇3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜇𝜇1 ∗1 + 𝜇𝜇2 ∗ 0 + 𝜇𝜇3 ∗ 0 = 𝜇𝜇1 . Likewise, the self-employee effect is 𝜇𝜇1𝑀𝑀 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜇𝜇3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜇𝜇1 ∗ 1 + 𝜇𝜇2 ∗ 1 + 𝜇𝜇3 ∗0 = 𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜇𝜇2 and the land-owning farmer effect is 𝜇𝜇1𝑀𝑀 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜇𝜇3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜇𝜇1 ∗ 1 + 𝜇𝜇2 ∗ 0 + 𝜇𝜇3 ∗ 1 = 𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜇𝜇3. 
Therefore, 𝜇𝜇2 and 𝜇𝜇3 are interpreted as additional effects to the effect (𝜇𝜇1) of MLFP, respectively. 
24 The “land-owning farmer” indicator is insignificant, due probably to its small number of observations. 
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none of the coefficients of the interaction terms with child gender are statistically significant 
in Table 2 or Table 3.  
 These results can be interpreted to mean that, for mothers who work, the time-
allocation pattern of their sons tend to be less pro-educational than their daughters’ (or, 
conversely, for working mothers the time-allocation pattern of their daughters tends to be 
more pro-educational than for their sons). The effects of MLFP on playing time for sons 
versus daughters contrast strongly, and their estimators are robust as shown in both Table 2 
and Table 3. Additionally, if working mothers are self-employed, the pro-educational effect 
of MLFP on their daughters is attenuated in comparison with mothers who are more formal 
workers. Based on the magnitudes of these estimators, this unfavorable attenuation affects 
all pro-educational, labor, and leisure activities.  
 The results thus far are summarized as follows: (i) sons whose mothers are working 
decrease their pro-educational time allocations deserving educational achievement and 
increase those time allocations as negative predictors of it; (ii) daughters whose mothers are 
working allocate their time opposite to their male siblings, displaying pro-educational 
behaviors; however (iii) the pro-educational effect of MLFP that is favorable for daughters is 
significantly attenuated if their mothers are self-employed rather than formal workers, and 
(iv) effects of time allocation for leisure and labor activities by children of self-employed 
mothers are homogeneous with respect to the child’s gender. 
 
E. Consideration of Family Structures 
 After considering the aforementioned, we note that family structures also predict 
child time allocations. Those daughters of female-headed households are more likely to work 
by engaging in their mothers’ jobs, and sons of households where fathers do not live together 
are likely to spend less time studying at home than sons in two-parent households. These 
family structures would require mothers to participate in the labor force more than otherwise, 
and their daughters are more likely to be required to spend some time working to help them 
in their jobs; and/or the mothers are less able to monitor their sons who may not be studying 
as much as they would be if the mother was there to observe them.25,26  
 One interpretation of the negative effect of MLFP on pro-educational time 
allocations by their children is that children are less likely to be monitored by their mothers 
as the children’s primary caregiver. This is justified by the qualitatively similar result 
regarding the estimator for the indicator of sons living apart from their mothers, because the 
indicator means the sons spend far less time with their mothers in their families (Battistella 
and Conacothe, 1998; Cortes, 2015; Nguyen, 2016). In this sense, male children are less likely 
to be monitored, scolded, or guided by their mothers to avoid playing too much or to study 
more when their mothers are working or are not living in the same household. Leisure time, 
                                                     
25 In the author’s fieldwork, there were mothers who described themselves as gradually having lost their 
ability to monitor their children, especially their sons, as they grew older. They explained that monitoring 
and guiding their children to avoid negatively impacting their studying was highly “time-intensive” due to 
the continuous demand for attention. Juveniles are reported to be prone to “play hooky” unless they are 
monitored by adults as a deterrence. This monitoring and guidance role falls more heavily upon mothers 
than fathers or any other family members, reflecting a traditional rural norm. 
26 In Table 3, consistent with this last observation, sons who do not live with their mothers are also more 
likely to spend more time playing. 
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particularly playing outside, is inversely correlated with positive school performance (see 
Appendix Table A- 4) and competes with time allocated to studying at home (see Appendix 
Table A- 5). Therefore, the more time allocated to playing, the more children are likely to 
underperform in school.  
 It is also interesting that the sons of working mothers are likely to spend time 
helping with the mothers’ jobs, and that irrespective of the working status of their mothers, 
male children are likely to allocate time to helping with their fathers’ jobs, even within the 
“Enrolled Sample” (Table 3). One conclusion that may be reached from these observations is 
that sons reap more leisure time by studying less at home and, at the same time, sons may 
be in a sense “acquitted” of such playful behaviors by working not only for their fathers but 
also for their mothers. In particular, because sons tend to engage in tasks such as carrying 
heavy items and animal caregiving as their household chores more often than their female 
siblings, it is likely that sons are expected to do some physically demanding tasks that 
mothers find difficult (see Appendix Table A- 6). 
 
VI. FURTHER ISSUES TO CONSIDER 
A. Determination of MLFP with Predetermined FLFP 
 In what situations are mothers more likely to participate in the labor force? Table 4 
shows an additional bivariate probit regression result of the determinants of MLFP. It is 
statistically probable that more educated mothers and mothers whose husbands have low 
earnings are more likely to participate in the labor force. The more young children they have, 
the less likely those mothers are to participate in the labor force. It means that women’s labor 
force participation is hindered by their childrearing role. These results from the sampled 
mothers are consistently similar to the findings of determinants of MLFP using nationally 
representative statistics (David et al., 2017: 16–19). The mothers’ own educational level is a 
significant and positive predictor of MLFP. In addition, MLFP does not simply increase 
proportionally as years of education increase; there is a sharp, kinking change, i.e., a dramatic 
increase upon reaching the college graduate level. This sharp increase is reported to be more 
pronounced in the Philippines compared to South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka 
(Cameron et al., 2001: 470–472). 
 These results are also consistent with the self-reported and perceived reasons for 
mothers to participate in the labor force, 86% of whom reported that it was their husbands’ 
earning difficulties that led them to decide to work (Table 5). Between eight and nine out of 
ten mothers who participate in the labor force are forced to work to make up for their 
husband’s insufficient earnings, while fewer than two out of ten enjoy working. However, 
this does not mean that fathers purposely chose to be unemployed or underemployed by 
leaning on and expecting their wives’ labor force participation.  
 In other words, FLFP is a given, a predetermined factor for mothers making their 
decisions about working. The Wald-test statistics of the null hypothesis that the 
determination of FLFP is exogenous to that of MLFP is shown in the bottom line of Table 4 
regarding the correlation of error terms in the system of equations. As stated in subsection C 
of section II, fathers (husbands) are socially considered to be breadwinners and they are 
expected to work regardless of their wives’ labor force participation. The null hypothesis is 
not rejected at any of conventional statistically significant levels. Hence, decisions regarding 
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mothers’ (wives’) labor force participation and that of fathers (husbands) are exogenous.  
 The estimated coefficient of the husbands’ age variable indicates that older 
husbands are less likely to be working but their wives are more likely to be working than 
wives whose husbands are younger. No significant relationship is found for the wife’s age. 
Not surprisingly, wives (mothers) are more likely to be working as their husbands’ earnings 
decrease. This result is consistent with the mothers’ self-reported reasons for working shown 
in Table 5, implying that mothers work to contribute income to their households, particularly 
in situations in which the household income is insufficient.  
 This is consistent with the result that mothers are more likely to withdraw from the 
labor force if wage trends for their husbands’ occupations are favorable, but they are also 
more likely to work if wage trends for their own occupations have been good. Once again, 
MLFP is shown to be a strategic choice to cope with poverty resulting from their husbands’ 
lower earning power or vulnerability in their household’s income. For mothers, MLFP is by 
and large determined by their husbands’ attributes. 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 around here 
 
B. MLFP in Family Dynamics 
 Thus far, the “unintended” negative effect of MLFP on their sons in terms of a 
decline in pro-educational time allocations have been discussed, while the daughters do not 
exhibit that unintended effect. It is important to note that this study does not blame working 
mothers for this result. This is not only from a human-rights perspective that assures the right 
of women to work whenever they want to, but also from a “family dynamics” perspective. 
In other words, MLFP is, on the one hand, a transformation of mothers’ own human capital, 
and, on the other hand, it serves as an insurance function in case their husbands’ earnings are 
insufficient. One motivation for MLFP is poverty faced by the mothers’ households. In this 
sense, MLFP is a rational strategy to cope with poverty or uncomfortable fluctuations in a 
household’s livelihood. 
 Whereas the Philippines has achieved high gender equality as represented, for 
example, by the annual global gender ranking from the World Economic Forum, the country 
also retains, to a significant extent, the social norm that the primary breadwinner of a 
household should be a man (father/husband). These seeming contradictions can create a 
situation where female labor force participation is minimally resisted and where the Filipino 
people understand that even in a rural setting, mothers (wives) may work due to necessity. 
This social climate in the Philippines and the high educational levels of contemporary 
Filipino women in recent years can support female labor force participation, and this 
participation should be understood as a joint outcome based not on women alone but also 
on the men who are their partners. 
 Certainly, women’s preferences to work whenever they want to do so should not 
be impeded or hindered. Yet, their involuntary decision to work (e.g., triggered by some 
household shock or insufficient income) should be alleviated. Here, the economic capacity 
of men is a factor. A man’s economic capacity is positively related to his level of education; 
however, it is noteworthy to recall that our empirical results show that male children’s pro-
educational time-use is negatively affected as an unintended effect of MLFP. Still, any 
attempt to blame working mothers for their boys’ underperformance in education is not 
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constructive. It is more constructive to examine if and how it is possible to compensate for 
reduced maternal involvement. 
 
C. Can a Mothers’ Roles Be Substituted? 
 The likelihood that mothers are not at home or reduce their available home-time 
with their children is higher if they work. Thus, we can hypothesize the following scenario, 
particularly in rural settings: maternal involvement with children may be substituted by 
some characteristics found in rural settings. Consider the extended-family system, which is 
widely seen in rural areas in the Philippines. In extended families, not just parents but also 
grandparents and/or other adult relatives live together. Therefore, even though working 
mothers may often be out of the home for long periods of time, we can hypothesize that other 
adult members at home can be substitutes for maternal involvement. If this hypothesis holds, 
the unintended negative effect of MLFP on sons in terms of their pro-educational time 
allocations can be reduced. 
 Here, we examine whether this effect can be empirically detected. The extended-
family indicator variable, its interactions with the MLFP indicator, and its interactions with 
the MLFP and child-gender indicator are added to the models presented in Eq. (3), creating 
an augmented model in Eq. (4) using the same instrument for MLFP, by 3SLS estimations: 
 
 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧
𝑡𝑡1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐱𝐱𝛄𝛄𝟏𝟏 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇11𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇12�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜇𝜇13𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇14�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+𝜇𝜇15�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜇𝜇16�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑒𝑒1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
𝑡𝑡2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐱𝐱𝛄𝛄𝟐𝟐 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇21𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇22�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜇𝜇23𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇24�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+𝜇𝜇25�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜇𝜇26�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑒𝑒2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
⋮
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐱𝐱𝛄𝛄𝐚𝐚 + 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎1𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎2�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎3𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎4�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎5�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎6�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
 (4) 
 
where 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is the child-gender indicator taking a value of one if child 𝑖𝑖 is male and zero if 
female; 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the MLFP indicator taking a value of one if the mother is working and zero if 
not working; and 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the extended-family indicator taking a value of one if household 
𝑗𝑗 that includes child 𝑖𝑖 is classified as an extended family and zero otherwise. Based on the 
previous discussions, the additional effects denoted as 𝜇𝜇(⋅)3, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)4, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)5, and 𝜇𝜇(⋅)6 in Eq. (4) 
are of particular concern. Eq. (4) is the system of equations model and thus the estimation 
follows the 3SLS method explained in subsection C of Section IV. 
 Table 6 selectively presents the estimators, 𝛾𝛾(⋅)𝐺𝐺 , 𝜇𝜇(⋅)1, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)2, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)3, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)4, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)5, and 
𝜇𝜇(⋅)6. As the baseline results were already interpreted in section V, this subsection specifically 
interprets the results for estimators of 𝛾𝛾(⋅)𝐺𝐺 , 𝜇𝜇(⋅)1, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)2, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)3, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)4, 𝜇𝜇(⋅)5, and 𝜇𝜇(⋅)6. Table 6 
reports the estimators for the “Full Sample” and Table 7 reports the results for the “Enrolled 
Sample.” Estimations for the “Enrolled Sample” also contain school-related covariates. Note 
that other covariates’ coefficients denoted as 𝐱𝐱𝛄𝛄(⋅) in Eq. (4) are not reported for the sake of 
space but are of qualitatively similar to estimation results shown in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 Similar to the results shown in Table 2 and Table 3, the augmented results in Table 
6 and Table 7 also show that male children are inclined to allocate less of their time to pro-
educational activities based on the estimators without gender interaction terms. The child-
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gender heterogeneity of the MLFP effect remains, showing that MLFP leads sons (daughters) 
to reduce (to add) studying time at home and to add (reduce) time allocated to leisure 
activities. When the extended-family indicator and its interaction terms are added, the 
estimator is not robust in Table 6 and Table 7, whereas the extended-family indicator alone 
(not representing any information other than being an extended family) only marginally 
indicates that children may spend more time in leisure activities in Table 6. 
 The interaction term of the MLFP indicator with the extended-family indicator 
captures the additional impact of being an extended family when the mother is working (not 
yet capturing the heterogeneity with respect to children’s genders). Its coefficient is 
significantly positive for time allocated to studying at home in both Table 6 and Table 7. This 
indicates that being an extended family positively augments MLFP’s impact on child pro-
educational time allocation, specifically for studying at home. As for the interaction term of 
three indicators, “boy × MLFP × extended family,” its coefficient is not significant with respect 
to time allocated to leisure, but does predict that sons will spend more time engaged in labor 
activities, which includes both fathers’ and mothers’ jobs. Hence, these results do not support 
the aforementioned hypothesis that the extended-family indicator does not reduce the 
unintended effect of MLFP for sons. 
 Based on this, we observe that: (i) the extended-family setting is, overall, likely to 
help children study longer at home even if their mothers participate in the labor force if we 
ignore child-gender heterogeneity and (ii) the unintended negative effect of MLFP that is 
gender heterogeneous and unfavorable to sons’ pro-educational behaviors is not reduced for 
sons in an extended-family setting. These results reconfirm the prime maternal role as the 
child-rearer that is not easily substituted, even by grandparents and other adult relatives. 
Female children tend to react in the opposite way to their male counterparts. Therefore, the 
attenuating function of the extended-family setting on the unintended effect of MLFP on 
sons is not found, emphatically confirming that mothers’ roles are crucial not only as 
supplementary breadwinners but also for their children’s education and development; in 
other words, mothers are bound by such a “dual burden.” 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 around here 
 
D. Validity of Instrument Variable: Inference by 2SLS Estimations 
 Using the 2SLS method, the Wu–Hausman test is performed to test the null 
hypothesis that the MLFP variable is exogenous. If the null hypothesis is rejected at a 
conventional statistical significance level, we conclude that the MLFP variable must be 
treated as an endogenous variable. The Wu–Hausman test is performed by determining 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between the estimators using OLS and 
2SLS. If the null hypothesis is rejected and the endogenous variable is replaced by the 
predicted value using the instrument variable, it is also conventional practice to consider the 
possibility of a weak instrument by referring to the first-stage F statistic. Weak instruments 
are considered irrelevant to the endogenous variable. 
 The 2SLS becomes the 3SLS when the correlations of error terms in the system of 
equations are considered. In this sense, although the 2SLS estimators do not consider the 
interdependency of the system of equations, it is still informative for the exogeneity test and 
the test for weak instrumental variables. By employing the 2SLS for all of the models in this 
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study, the instrument variable is now used in the first-stage equation for MLFP.  
 Table 8 presents the result of the Wu–Hausman test (its chi-square statistics and 
statistical significance) on the null hypothesis that the MLFP variable is exogenous to the 
dependent variables of time allocations and other model specifications that correspond to 
the 3SLS estimators. Table 9 reports the results for the first-stage equation, including the 
coefficients of the instrument variable, robust standard errors and significance levels and the 
Stock-Yogo F statistic for the first-stage equation. If the instrument variable is statistically 
significant and the F statistic is larger than a rule-of-thumb value of ten, it is considered valid. 
According to the results of Wu–Hausman test shown in Table 8, the exogeneity of MLFP is 
not statistically rejected for children’s time allocations to studying at home, schooling, and 
leisure (both playing and using computer-game shops). This reconfirms that the estimations 
should be performed not by OLS but by 2SLS, and not by SUR but by 3SLS.  
 Information on the validity of the instrument variable is presented in Table 9. The 
instrument variable is robustly positive below the 5% level (precisely, below 2%) through all 
of the specifications and samples corresponding to those in 3SLS estimations. This indicates 
that the instrument variable is relevant and explanatory for MLFP, and that when wage 
trends in the relevant labor market are positive, more Filipino mothers are likely to 
participate in the labor force. The first-stage F statistic is also consistently larger than the rule-
of-thumb value of ten. For these reasons, we conclude that the instrument variable is 
statistically valid and relevant. 
 
Table 8 and Table 9 around here 
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS  
This study found the following dynamics at work among children of rural families in the 
Philippines, based on the results of the analyses provided. Compared to daughters in a 
family, sons are less likely to spend time on pro-educational activities when their mothers 
work compared to sons whose mothers do not work. This is referred to as the “unintended 
effect” of MLFP in this study, and the instrument variable approach finds there is causality. 
However, MLFP is most often motivated by a family’s low income, represented by the 
father’s insufficient earnings or unemployment, rather than by the mother’s desire to work. 
In this sense, MLFP is an insurance-like strategy mothers use to cope with poverty and/or 
fluctuating household income. Working mothers are likely to have attained a higher level of 
education than their non-working counterparts, and daughters’ reverse behavioral patterns 
compared to sons are likely motivated by their working mothers serving as role models. 
 Furthermore, these results indicate there is gender-dependent heterogeneous effect 
of MLFP on children’s time allocation that reconfirms the important maternal role that 
mothers play in families with respect to their children’s education, particularly for sons, and 
that mothers cannot rely on others to act as surrogates in that role. As shown in Figure 3, 
these dynamics indicate a continuation of a vicious cycle of boys’ educational 
underperformance and mothers’ dual burdens unless some part of the cycle is alleviated. 
 
Figure 3 around here  
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 Traditionally, the phrase or cliché in Tagalog language has expressed the notion 
that fathers are “haligi ng tahanan,” meaning the breadwinners of the family, and mothers are 
“ilaw ng tahanan,” meaning the beacon of the home. This emphasizes the powerful roles 
played by Filipino mothers in the family (Torres-Yu, 2011). The cliché, “(mothers are) ilaw ng 
tahanan,” describes mothers’ extensive roles in guiding their children, teaching them good 
manners, making things run smoothly at home, doing everything for the betterment of the 
family, and above all, always thinking about their family (Torres-Yu, 2011: 45). 27  The 
expression of “beacon” or “light” is a companion expression to fathers as “breadwinners” in 
the same families.28 
 The results in this study indicate that through MLFP, mothers play a role of “haligi 
ng tahanan,” which has traditionally been played by the father, in addition to playing the role 
of “ilaw ng tahanan,” another “unintended” effect of MLFP. This is a reminder that mothers 
are bound by a “dual burden.” The fact that maternal involvement is irreplaceable was 
reconfirmed in this study, as we show that other family members cannot adequately replace 
the mother’s involvement with her children, particularly with her sons, even in an extended-
family setting such as is widely found in rural Philippines. Most importantly, however, we 
emphasize that this study does not assert in any way that mothers’ decisions to participate 
in the labor force are at fault. Their decisions to work are a rational strategy for coping with 
temporary or chronic insufficiencies in household income.  
 These “dual-burden” interpretations also re-expose (or merely confirm) a highly 
traditional aspect of gender inequality in the Philippines, despite the global discourse praising 
the country’s gender equality (see, for example, subsection B of section VI). Ways to reduce 
current gender disparities in education, maternal roles and parental involvement should be 
reemphasized and reevaluated. At the same time, fathers’ contributions to the family should 
not be overlooked.  
 A father’s ability to support his family financially not only improves his children’s 
circumstances (e.g., the income effect shown in Section V), but it also allows his wife to work 
only when she wants to (i.e., to leverage her education). It is not necessary to restate that a 
woman’s voluntary decision to work must be respected by family members, businesses, 
communities, and governments. Yet, the portion of MLFP that is due to involuntarily 
decisions by mothers triggered by husbands’ inability to provide sufficient income for the 
family is an issue to be addressed. As in Goldin’s (1995) U-shaped hypothesis of the 
relationship between wealth levels and female labor force participation noted by Sawada et 
al. (2006), higher female labor force participation rates do not necessarily represent higher 
wealth levels and vice versa unless the reasons for working are examined in-depth. Even 
                                                     
27 Indeed, our questionnaire survey collected data regarding this anecdote. We asked both children and 
parents to identify the person who is most concerned with child issues in the family; the frequencies and 
percentages for the family member that the children and parents cited is shown in Appendix Table A- 7. 
Children typically (77.7%) consider their mothers to be the person most concerned with the children. 
Likewise, when the question was asked of the parents, the adults presented the same result (82.7%). In 
addition, Appendix Table A- 8 shows that both mothers and their children mutually believe that it is the 
mothers who are most involved with their children’s issues. Only 17 out of 283 cases (6% of the sample) 
involved pairs where both fathers and their children answered that it was the father. In contrast, in 194 out 
of 283 cases (68.6%) both mothers and the children answered that it was mothers (in the remaining 72 cases 
(25%), the paired responses were not the same). 
28 In contemporary life in the Philippines, this assumption might be naïve and misleading because more 
mothers are also in the role of breadwinner for their families. 
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when a woman works, the wellbeing of her family or of herself can still be low despite her 
apparently more empowered status.  
 The paradox is that, on the one hand, MLFP contributes to female empowerment 
and social progress; on the other hand, the “unintended” effect of MLFP implies that mothers 
are needed by, and thus are compelled to stay with their children, particularly to monitor 
their sons to prevent them from reducing their pro-educational activities, thereby limiting 
their potential for human capital accumulation. Furthermore, results presented here show 
that living in an extended-family setting does not mitigate the unfavorable “unintended” 
effect of MLFP for sons. The extended-family setting can prevent children from spending 
more time in leisure, but this effect is homogenous with respect to child gender and thus the 
“unintended effect” of MLFP on sons remains. These findings reinforce the notion that a 
mother’s influence cannot be replaced by other family members, thus imposing a “dual 
burden” on working mothers. It is a feasible interpretation to say that it is the mothers who 
can both scold and guide their children, and to whom children listen the most, compared to 
other adult family members. 
 Using a time-allocation analyses, this study has shown one causal consequence 
from the “unintended” effect of MLFP in reducing sons’ pro-educational behaviors. The 
results, along with the aforementioned poverty-driven family dynamics adds to the existing 
literature by explaining the link between boys’ educational underperformance and poverty, 
providing a pathway for analyzing why underperformance among boys in the Philippines 
is more pronounced in rural areas and among poorer households. There are risks for male 
schoolchildren when their mothers are in the labor force, given its heterogeneous effect on 
child genders. Policy options to alleviate poverty thus need to be designed to incorporate 
these family dynamics. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Time-Allocation Analysis 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variables:
Time allocation, 7 days
Sleeping 3610.23 435.94 3598.72 429.73
Studying at home 279.14 267.17 307.71 271.19
Schooling (in min) 2097.54 913.50 2307.52 663.46
Schooling (in days) 4.31 1.61 4.71 0.95
Helping with fathers' jobs 111.48 253.88 86.53 186.64
Helping with mothers' jobs 76.72 175.54 83.82 182.75
Household chores 447.04 367.75 450.72 365.22
Playing 228.65 308.90 198.99 291.19
Computer game shops 54.30 131.46 48.15 103.17
Independent variables and covariates:
Individual characteristics
Enrolling (=1) 0.91 0.28 n.a. n.a.
Male (=1) 0.46 0.50 0.41 0.49
Age 15.22 2.84 15.14 2.62
Lowly aspired child 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.22
Eldest (=1) 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39
Youngest (=1) 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40
Elder siblings 2.68 2.33 2.69 2.44
Younger siblings 1.80 1.45 1.77 1.38
Household characteristics
Father is working (=1) 0.93 0.25 0.94 0.24
MLFP indicator (=1 if MLFP) 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50
Mother: Land-owning farmer (=1) 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09
Mother: Self-employment (=1) 0.35 0.48 0.38 0.49
ln percapita income 6.97 1.05 7.08 1.02
Remittance share to HH income 0.14 0.24 0.13 0.24
Father's age 47.17 7.81 46.93 7.56
Mother's age 44.91 6.89 44.57 6.39
Father's education (=1 if college graduate) 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33
Mother's education (=1 if college graduate) 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Female headed (=1) 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16
Separate father (=1) 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Separate mother (=1) 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28
School variables
Public school (=1) n.a. n.a. 0.90 0.29
Walking to schools (=1) n.a. n.a. 0.20 0.40
Distance (km) n.a. n.a. 3.58 5.07
Days to exam (as of first interview date) n.a. n.a. 42.30 10.83
Variables
Full Sample Enrolled Sample
(N = 284) (N = 221)
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the author’s primary data. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Child Time-Allocations (3SLS Estimators): Full Sample 
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Child-own Individual characterstics:
Enrolled school (=1) -195.95* -233.86** 240.74*** 267.93*** 1957.69*** 1951.91*** 4.42*** 4.35*** -253.03*** -208.74*** -3.36 -9.06 -163.61* -220.95** -229.95*** -246.41*** -44.59 -63.84*
[114.92] [119.14] [70.35] [68.38] [174.44] [169.49] [0.24] [0.24] [60.83] [62.09] [44.55] [45.66] [92.67] [93.69] [79.00] [70.95] [35.60] [34.59]
Boy indicator (=1) -61.06 -284.68 -111.73*** 78.05 -156.28* -153.86 -0.13 -0.30 114.28*** 276.12** -1.11 -18.69 -149.03*** -297.62 208.37*** 9.43 32.61* -31.14
[57.36] [265.23] [35.11] [152.23] [87.07] [377.31] [0.12] [0.54] [30.36] [138.22] [22.24] [101.64] [46.25] [208.57] [39.43] [157.95] [17.77] [77.01]
Age -8.47 -14.16 -9.11 0.75 -54.60*** -35.54** -0.04 -0.03 15.33** 13.99** 2.93 -0.74 18.80* 11.84 -2.74 -16.00** 6.76 2.15
[13.86] [12.68] [8.48] [7.28] [21.03] [18.04] [0.03] [0.03] [7.33] [6.61] [5.37] [4.86] [11.17] [9.97] [9.53] [7.55] [4.29] [3.68]
No. of younger siblings 31.68 44.16 47.53** 4.45 18.56 -62.83 0.05 -0.02 -10.97 0.68 -13.17 -1.82 -16.40 5.41 -50.42** -6.79 -8.98 7.33
[34.70] [32.25] [21.24] [18.51] [52.68] [45.88] [0.07] [0.07] [18.37] [16.81] [13.45] [12.36] [27.98] [25.36] [23.86] [19.20] [10.75] [9.36]
No. of older siblings 38.12** 33.25* 16.64 9.57 -17.82 -24.05 0.04 0.03 3.28 3.45 -8.75 -10.25 3.36 4.92 -10.50 -8.41 -1.51 -0.39
[18.53] [19.71] [11.35] [11.32] [28.13] [28.05] [0.04] [0.04] [9.81] [10.27] [7.18] [7.56] [14.94] [15.50] [12.74] [11.74] [5.74] [5.72]
First: Birth order (=1) 124.67 89.69 102.58** 128.50** 76.95 168.52 0.23 0.15 -68.17 -44.57 -22.42 -35.94 71.90 -13.68 -77.77 -78.02 -8.36 -24.83
[84.46] [104.44] [51.71] [59.94] [128.21] [148.58] [0.18] [0.21] [44.71] [54.43] [32.74] [40.02] [68.11] [82.13] [58.07] [62.20] [26.16] [30.33]
Boy * First: Birth Order 162.24 -20.41 -255.13 0.06 -79.14 4.34 299.62** 22.06 50.46
[155.98] [89.52] [221.90] [0.32] [81.29] [59.78] [122.66] [92.89] [45.29]
Youngest: Birth Older (=1) 54.08 91.51 34.37 -5.93 10.39 -11.21 0.12 0.16 3.85 125.73** -9.85 25.67 -87.40 -184.84** 11.33 9.39 27.76 0.19
[86.13] [107.38] [52.73] [61.63] [130.74] [152.76] [0.18] [0.22] [45.59] [55.96] [33.39] [41.15] [69.45] [84.44] [59.21] [63.95] [26.68] [31.18]
Boy * Youngest: Birth Older (=1) -27.66 19.44 -88.72 -0.14 -211.71*** -41.77 246.23** 72.69 91.60**
[142.21] [81.62] [202.30] [0.29] [74.11] [54.50] [111.83] [84.69] [41.29]
Low aspire by parents -174.78 -270.95 46.65 -13.48 -203.46 -234.75 -0.24 0.21 11.97 -38.69 -18.50 -4.85 -130.69 -182.66 59.77 -133.30 2.57 -22.48
[116.22] [195.48] [71.15] [112.19] [176.41] [278.09] [0.25] [0.40] [61.52] [101.87] [45.06] [74.91] [93.71] [153.72] [79.90] [116.41] [36.00] [56.76]
Boy * Low aspired by adults 131.84 15.53 -15.16 -0.67 63.50 -5.10 93.44 312.47** 54.63
[216.54] [124.28] [308.05] [0.44] [112.85] [82.98] [170.28] [128.96] [62.87]
Household characterstics:
Father's age -9.40 -5.91 0.94 -1.14 3.34 -7.46 0.01 0.00 -3.02 -1.95 -0.84 0.11 -1.73 2.09 -6.43 -0.25 -3.38* -1.51
[6.51] [5.63] [3.99] [3.23] [9.89] [8.01] [0.01] [0.01] [3.45] [2.93] [2.53] [2.16] [5.25] [4.43] [4.48] [3.35] [2.02] [1.64]
Mothers' age 8.37 7.85 4.14 2.79 9.20 12.41 0.01 0.02 -3.46 -3.99 0.18 0.95 -5.92 -6.66 0.72 -0.12 1.25 1.64
[6.36] [6.48] [3.89] [3.72] [9.65] [9.22] [0.01] [0.01] [3.37] [3.38] [2.47] [2.48] [5.13] [5.09] [4.37] [3.86] [1.97] [1.88]
Household size 17.52 18.06 17.33 20.49* 32.36 33.36 0.02 0.02 -5.56 -5.73 1.64 1.69 -5.71 -5.89 -4.94 -5.09 -5.01 -5.16
[20.11] [21.38] [11.23] [12.27] [27.82] [30.41] [0.04] [0.04] [10.13] [11.14] [4.11] [8.19] [11.33] [16.81] [9.99] [12.73] [5.55] [6.21]
Father's education (=1 if college graduate) 127.88 148.81 33.60 -0.64 191.06 96.97 0.00 -0.10 -68.00 -67.35 -58.71 -49.76 -233.40** -199.82** -32.79 15.85 -189.10*** -165.61***
[134.83] [128.98] [82.54] [74.03] [204.66] [183.49] [0.29] [0.26] [71.37] [67.22] [52.27] [49.43] [108.72] [101.43] [92.69] [76.81] [41.77] [37.45]
Mother's education (=1 if college graduate) 177.22 5.38 -194.51* -19.83 -827.93*** -417.37** -0.42 -0.02 69.02 40.82 122.66 65.35 183.75 12.03 240.30* -14.10 207.18*** 117.85***
[192.95] [118.39] [118.12] [67.95] [292.88] [168.42] [0.41] [0.24] [102.14] [61.70] [74.80] [45.37] [155.58] [93.10] [132.65] [70.50] [59.77] [34.38]
log income -24.58 -17.70 68.13*** 80.93*** 91.50 140.42** 0.07 0.13 14.67 8.21 -1.35 -3.56 -25.02 -30.14 0.72 -19.67 27.35** 20.70*
[41.45] [41.83] [25.38] [24.01] [62.92] [59.51] [0.09] [0.09] [21.94] [21.80] [16.07] [16.03] [33.42] [32.90] [28.50] [24.91] [12.84] [12.15]
Remittance share -56.72 -100.88 -181.55** -192.43** -160.68 -145.99 -0.87*** -0.88*** -29.85 -49.90 11.10 4.00 -17.28 -5.37 -12.28 -21.97 21.18 32.59
[151.03] [153.53] [92.46] [88.11] [229.25] [218.40] [0.32] [0.31] [79.95] [80.01] [58.55] [58.83] [121.79] [120.73] [103.83] [91.43] [46.79] [44.58]
Fathers' Labor Force Participation (FLFP) 200.90 129.02 21.48 -0.02 -28.43 -181.81 0.13 -0.08 6.65 75.58 -18.31 2.84 -59.18 -73.43 -145.06* -102.68 68.80* 80.85*
[127.39] [157.61] [77.99] [90.46] [193.37] [224.22] [0.27] [0.32] [67.44] [82.14] [49.39] [60.40] [102.72] [123.94] [87.58] [93.86] [39.46] [45.76]
Boy* FLFP 187.37 -133.09 119.86 0.26 -101.16 -7.42 88.58 59.79 34.24
[237.46] [136.29] [337.80] [0.49] [123.75] [91.00] [186.73] [141.41] [68.95]
Household Chores Playing
Computer-game
Shop Usage
Variables
Sleep
Education Labor Leisurely Activities
Study at Home Schooling (min.) Schooling (days)
Working for Fathers'
Jobs
Working for
Mothers' Jobs
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Table 2: Determinants of Child Time-Allocations (3SLS Estimators): Full Sample (Cont.) 
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Mothers' Labor Force Participation (MLFP) -262.73 59.67 316.32* 47.36 918.38* 129.74 0.87 -0.02 -109.64 -8.45 -114.57 -47.52 -309.36 26.85 -516.35** -69.19 -219.44** -57.81*
[313.44] [118.68] [191.88] [68.11] [475.78] [168.83] [0.66] [0.24] [165.92] [61.85] [121.51] [45.48] [252.75] [93.32] [215.48] [70.67] [97.10] [34.46]
Boy * MLFP -71.15 -152.28* -161.46 -0.09 -15.97 107.32* -127.97 199.98** 23.53
[151.95] [87.21] [216.16] [0.31] [79.19] [58.23] [119.49] [90.49] [44.12]
Mother: Land-owner farmer 237.22 21.90 -396.56 -217.29 -150.56 364.25 0.40 1.05 81.84 93.92 140.99 109.23 298.88 15.49 239.52 -96.53 348.61*** 215.88**
[429.09] [372.87] [262.68] [214.00] [651.33] [530.43] [0.91] [0.76] [227.14] [194.32] [166.35] [142.89] [346.00] [293.21] [294.99] [222.05] [132.92] [108.26]
Boy : Mother: Land-owner farmer n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mother: Self-employee 298.90 52.01 -281.67** -83.72 -945.80*** -407.85** -0.83* -0.23 96.86 43.27 206.33** 156.21*** 266.62 18.97 395.95** 49.88 176.59** 52.10
[233.77] [122.30] [143.11] [70.19] [354.84] [173.98] [0.49] [0.25] [123.74] [63.74] [90.63] [46.87] [188.50] [96.17] [160.71] [72.83] [72.41] [35.51]
Boy : Mother: Self-employee 110.93 129.74 122.51 0.10 20.65 -62.83 74.44 -83.95 -14.14
[163.56] [93.87] [232.68] [0.34] [85.24] [62.68] [128.62] [97.40] [47.49]
Female-headed household (=1) -263.12 -190.97 2.37 -186.85 -41.30 97.81 0.14 0.58 -165.24* 62.98 173.70*** 341.06*** -128.69 -247.02 69.13 70.95 -62.96 -4.69
[169.50] [254.37] [103.77] [145.99] [257.29] [361.87] [0.36] [0.52] [89.73] [132.57] [65.71] [97.48] [136.68] [200.03] [116.53] [151.48] [52.51] [73.86]
Boy x Female-headed household -30.92 264.38 -278.01 -0.71 -334.85** -248.59** 213.09 17.07 -95.16
[324.61] [186.30] [461.78] [0.67] [169.17] [124.40] [255.26] [193.31] [94.25]
Father lives separately -49.59 0.97 -33.90 44.28 -72.49 -382.57* -0.15 -0.54* -152.64*** -46.21 -20.96 -5.87 13.58 54.40 -146.34** -92.41 -33.56 -8.79
[106.60] [139.19] [65.26] [79.89] [161.81] [198.02] [0.23] [0.29] [56.43] [72.54] [41.33] [53.34] [85.96] [109.46] [73.28] [82.89] [33.02] [40.42]
Boy * Father lives separately 4.60 -184.34* 368.48 0.40 -144.86* 4.21 -42.77 52.20 -19.11
[167.52] [96.15] [238.32] [0.34] [87.30] [64.20] [131.74] [99.76] [48.64]
Mother lives separately 312.01*** 254.99* -85.35 -118.98 -263.74 -152.33 -0.39* -0.38 36.84 -64.90 -70.22 -84.44 -9.08 63.86 49.16 56.20 21.55 64.85
[110.20] [142.13] [67.46] [81.58] [167.28] [202.20] [0.23] [0.29] [58.33] [74.07] [42.72] [54.47] [88.86] [111.77] [75.76] [84.64] [34.14] [41.27]
Boy * Mother lives separately 82.42 -41.14 -366.21 -0.10 225.78** 47.20 -154.41 78.12 -65.18
[204.88] [117.58] [291.45] [0.42] [106.77] [78.51] [161.11] [122.01] [59.49]
Constants 3802.81*** 3613.60*** -676.60*** -729.95*** -68.56 -76.44 -0.81 -0.69 310.58 223.99 100.28 28.16 1020.26*** 1024.61*** 1057.25*** 962.20*** -25.56 -49.81
[409.86] [427.79] [250.91] [245.52] [622.13] [608.56] [0.87] [0.88] [216.96] [222.94] [158.89] [163.94] [330.49] [336.40] [281.77] [254.75] [126.96] [124.21]
Region Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumetator Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Effect No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
R 2 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.30 0.56 0.63 0.73 0.75 0.30 0.36 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.30 0.20 0.43 0.12 0.26
No. of Obs. 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284
Household Chores Playing
Computer-game
Shop Usage
Variables
Sleep
Education Labor Leisurely Activities
Study at Home Schooling (min.) Schooling (days)
Working for Fathers'
Jobs
Working for
Mothers' Jobs
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
Notes:  Numbers in brackets are the small-sample adjusted standard errors. 
Source:  Author’s calculations using the author’s surveyed data. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Child Time-Allocations (3SLS Estimators): Enrolled Sample 
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Child-own Individual characterstics:
Boy indicator (=1) -46.59 -419.25 -137.94*** -52.92 -214.74* -646.51 -0.15 -0.37 116.39*** 334.27** 34.69 162.10 -112.76* -421.44 200.24*** 107.32 40.47** 71.74
[78.08] [442.03] [52.88] [270.96] [111.88] [587.30] [0.15] [0.85] [31.55] [168.37] [30.05] [166.01] [61.43] [329.64] [41.64] [222.48] [18.51] [100.10]
Age -16.55 -18.66 -6.93 -5.30 -54.05* -55.47* -0.01 -0.01 22.91*** 24.18*** 3.62 4.43 22.60 11.20 -14.48 -10.10 2.24 -0.15
[20.68] [21.53] [14.00] [13.20] [29.62] [28.61] [0.04] [0.04] [8.35] [8.20] [7.96] [8.09] [16.27] [16.06] [11.02] [10.84] [4.90] [4.88]
No. of younger siblings 46.91 59.16 54.33* 17.39 54.09 3.58 0.10 0.05 -17.74 -0.21 -20.71 -15.56 -39.94 15.92 -30.98 -19.95 -1.50 14.22
[42.01] [47.25] [28.45] [28.97] [60.19] [62.78] [0.08] [0.09] [16.97] [18.00] [16.16] [17.75] [33.05] [35.24] [22.40] [23.78] [9.96] [10.70]
No. of older siblings 42.51* 41.57 27.82* 21.37 -30.43 -36.76 -0.01 -0.03 -10.10 -2.71 -16.22* -19.10* 24.66 42.74** -5.64 -3.26 4.86 8.60
[22.39] [26.14] [15.16] [16.03] [32.08] [34.74] [0.04] [0.05] [9.05] [9.96] [8.61] [9.82] [17.61] [19.50] [11.94] [13.16] [5.31] [5.92]
First: Birth order (=1) 23.43 5.55 139.50** 135.39* -57.31 0.62 0.05 0.05 -61.55 -44.04 -39.43 -74.94 70.20 -22.62 5.63 -11.18 5.61 -0.88
[101.06] [123.28] [68.44] [75.57] [144.81] [163.79] [0.20] [0.24] [40.83] [46.96] [38.89] [46.30] [79.51] [91.93] [53.89] [62.05] [23.95] [27.92]
Boy * First: Birth Order 89.84 82.39 -150.40 0.02 -66.69 67.29 252.12* -3.24 7.89
[195.51] [119.85] [259.77] [0.38] [74.47] [73.43] [145.80] [98.41] [44.27]
Youngest: Birth Older (=1) 37.48 77.65 58.40 -16.17 -14.63 -69.66 0.24 0.29 14.77 122.84** -11.38 17.01 -107.12 -160.71 -49.06 13.44 12.11 14.41
[108.50] [133.40] [73.48] [81.77] [155.47] [177.24] [0.21] [0.26] [43.84] [50.81] [41.75] [50.10] [85.36] [99.48] [57.86] [67.14] [25.72] [30.21]
Boy * Youngest: Birth Older (=1) -3.02 60.83 70.68 -0.06 -259.55*** -74.44 222.44 -151.59 16.95
[194.11] [118.99] [257.91] [0.37] [73.94] [72.90] [144.76] [97.70] [43.96]
Low aspire by parents -196.27 -255.61 56.21 -73.99 -317.33 -171.96 -0.16 0.15 92.26 -11.95 46.29 -75.26 33.80 -59.27 40.06 -6.95 -4.89 -34.30
[168.67] [288.12] [114.23] [176.62] [241.68] [382.81] [0.33] [0.55] [68.15] [109.74] [64.90] [108.21] [132.70] [214.86] [89.94] [145.02] [39.98] [65.24]
Boy * Low aspired by adults 67.18 138.84 -414.60 -0.69 215.21 230.26* 209.74 161.49 64.74
[351.01] [215.17] [466.37] [0.67] [133.70] [131.82] [261.76] [176.67] [79.49]
Household characterstics:
Father's age -9.01 -5.31 -2.97 -7.71* 0.50 -7.53 0.00 0.00 -0.20 -0.29 0.33 1.54 -6.00 -6.17 -0.45 1.33 -1.95 -1.19
[8.55] [7.56] [5.79] [4.63] [12.25] [10.05] [0.02] [0.01] [3.45] [2.88] [3.29] [2.84] [6.72] [5.64] [4.56] [3.81] [2.03] [1.71]
Mothers' age 10.08 10.00 5.03 5.95 24.75* 31.64*** 0.03 0.03** -4.90 -5.82* -1.17 -1.40 -10.83 -8.83 -1.36 -3.74 0.07 0.33
[8.84] [9.11] [5.99] [5.59] [12.67] [12.11] [0.02] [0.02] [3.57] [3.47] [3.40] [3.42] [6.95] [6.80] [4.71] [4.59] [2.10] [2.06]
Household size 14.85 10.57 24.23 0.06 -23.04* 0.85 -37.13 -2.26 -12.82*
[31.33] [19.20] [41.62] [0.06] [11.93] [11.77] [23.36] [15.77] [7.09]
Father's education (=1 if college graduate 114.24 168.87 53.01 -30.32 116.35 55.50 -0.24 -0.19 -63.57 -56.21 -61.78 -78.10 -256.79* -257.55** -16.41 -41.22 -108.21** -86.80**
[180.37] [172.53] [122.15] [105.76] [258.44] [229.23] [0.35] [0.33] [72.87] [65.72] [69.40] [64.80] [141.90] [128.66] [96.18] [86.84] [42.75] [39.07]
Mother's education (=1 if college graduat 187.49 -24.20 -254.29 23.63 -913.03** -585.96*** -0.27 -0.34 104.38 102.11 150.56 117.26* 217.10 23.59 0.74 -36.27 81.37 18.63
[259.22] [164.25] [175.56] [100.69] [371.42] [218.24] [0.51] [0.32] [104.73] [62.56] [99.75] [61.69] [203.93] [122.49] [138.23] [82.67] [61.44] [37.20]
log income -27.34 -13.86 82.20** 85.33** 148.47* 204.41*** 0.21* 0.28** -4.25 -23.62 -17.28 -26.08 6.59 10.24 0.18 -12.33 15.94 11.70
[54.49] [56.41] [36.90] [34.58] [78.07] [74.95] [0.11] [0.11] [22.01] [21.49] [20.97] [21.18] [42.87] [42.07] [29.05] [28.39] [12.91] [12.77]
Remittance share -92.74 -188.11 -229.37 -109.46 -452.33 -330.98 -0.71* -0.74* 34.17 43.95 57.31 28.06 -209.00 -236.52 -26.46 -106.08 44.70 39.49
[221.08] [211.96] [149.72] [129.93] [316.77] [281.62] [0.43] [0.41] [89.32] [80.73] [85.07] [79.60] [173.92] [158.06] [117.89] [106.68] [52.40] [48.00]
Paternal LFP 204.78 131.04 82.21 50.10 -159.96 -338.48 -0.22 -0.35 49.20 138.01* -15.51 40.05 -22.90 19.02 -157.79* -146.76 21.54 57.12
[161.84] [190.74] [109.60] [116.92] [231.89] [253.42] [0.32] [0.37] [65.38] [72.65] [62.27] [71.63] [127.32] [142.24] [86.30] [96.00] [38.36] [43.19]
Boy* Paternal LFP 320.22 -16.75 458.47 0.26 -142.33 -194.58 241.87 -41.46 -30.10
[411.36] [252.17] [546.56] [0.79] [156.69] [154.49] [306.77] [207.05] [93.15]
Maternal LFP -162.71 155.24 412.21 35.94 913.06* 195.18 0.27 0.00 -140.39 -26.22 -137.50 -88.35 -245.11 51.44 -177.87 -105.82 -141.84 -10.61
[378.38] [149.49] [256.26] [91.64] [542.17] [198.63] [0.74] [0.29] [152.87] [56.94] [145.60] [56.14] [297.68] [111.48] [201.77] [75.24] [89.69] [33.85]
Household Chores Playing
Computer-game
Shop Usage
Variables
Sleep
Education Labor Leisurely Activities
Study at Home Schooling (min.) Schooling (days)
Working for Fathers'
Jobs
Working for
Mothers' Jobs
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Table 3: Determinants of Child Time-Allocations (3SLS Estimators): Enrolled Sample (Cont.) 
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Boy * Maternal LFP -63.11 -162.36 -99.14 0.01 -33.86 129.81* -37.36 235.19** -42.03
[196.67] [120.56] [261.31] [0.38] [74.91] [73.86] [146.66] [98.99] [44.54]
Mother: Land-owner farmer 98.69 -101.85 -398.56 -232.48 359.95 631.16 1.01 1.03 2.14 9.76 100.60 107.19 406.19 274.89 2.19 51.68 203.18* 123.51
[460.35] [427.47] [311.77] [262.04] [659.61] [567.97] [0.90] [0.82] [185.99] [162.83] [177.14] [160.54] [362.16] [318.78] [245.48] [215.16] [109.12] [96.80]
Mother: Self-employee 201.25 -62.63 -320.39* -60.76 -930.90** -585.87*** -0.48 -0.43 126.25 64.88 231.36** 198.33*** 260.09 63.46 138.57 89.33 119.87* 22.76
[274.73] [149.74] [186.06] [91.79] [393.65] [198.95] [0.54] [0.29] [111.00] [57.04] [105.72] [56.24] [216.14] [111.67] [146.50] [75.37] [65.12] [33.91]
Boy : Mother: Self-employee 128.79 140.17 329.05 0.15 9.32 -64.69 -104.13 -64.94 18.95
[206.03] [126.30] [273.74] [0.40] [78.48] [77.38] [153.64] [103.70] [46.66]
Female-headed household (=1) -188.14 -69.07 57.40 -160.94 148.69 91.80 -0.05 0.40 -71.28 78.71 311.63*** 355.98*** -74.22 -101.87 19.82 -48.05 -61.23 -6.88
[267.54] [304.71] [181.19] [186.79] [383.34] [404.85] [0.52] [0.58] [108.09] [116.06] [102.95] [114.44] [210.48] [227.23] [142.66] [153.37] [63.41] [69.00]
Boy x Female-headed household -208.20 525.52* -844.83 -2.05** -72.35 35.74 359.75 409.86 -46.51
[498.83] [305.78] [662.77] [0.96] [190.01] [187.34] [371.99] [251.07] [112.96]
Father lives separately -50.26 -83.24 1.84 83.06 -262.49 -629.31** -0.44 -0.81** -48.46 70.97 36.85 81.63 -30.42 -170.41 -163.52** -123.08 5.73 0.71
[143.64] [184.49] [97.28] [113.09] [205.81] [245.12] [0.28] [0.35] [58.03] [70.27] [55.27] [69.29] [113.00] [137.58] [76.59] [92.86] [34.05] [41.78]
Boy * Father lives separately 133.69 -252.60* 468.30 0.57 -198.25** -44.20 236.50 6.62 21.20
[232.00] [142.22] [308.25] [0.45] [88.37] [87.13] [173.01] [116.77] [52.54]
Mother lives separately 319.46** 235.76 -132.16 -41.98 -376.20* -203.39 -0.56* -0.46 -45.76 -63.67 -72.13 -84.71 -19.92 77.53 135.70 30.61 49.77 63.42*
[157.78] [169.66] [106.86] [104.00] [226.08] [225.42] [0.31] [0.33] [63.75] [64.62] [60.71] [63.72] [124.13] [126.52] [84.14] [85.39] [37.40] [38.42]
Boy * Mother lives separately 21.37 -144.12 -208.75 -0.47 27.30 -24.42 -318.70 268.94* -58.35
[311.79] [191.13] [414.26] [0.60] [118.76] [117.10] [232.51] [156.93] [70.60]
School variables:
Public school (=1) -1203.16** -1178.44** 410.02 409.72 -385.62 -472.70 0.35 0.28 -149.06 -112.97 -179.64 -221.71 652.04 600.78 27.32 -1.32 51.60 49.37
[508.15] [517.28] [344.14] [317.10] [728.11] [687.29] [1.00] [0.99] [205.30] [197.03] [195.53] [194.27] [399.77] [385.75] [270.97] [260.36] [120.45] [117.14]
Going to school on foot (=1) -74.45 -123.36 -49.48 -21.01 -424.82** -256.39 -0.15 -0.08 70.28 58.87 13.97 0.75 159.76 94.34 125.22 135.99** 48.03 28.25
[145.30] [136.90] [98.40] [83.92] [208.19] [181.89] [0.28] [0.26] [58.70] [52.14] [55.91] [51.41] [114.31] [102.09] [77.48] [68.90] [34.44] [31.00]
Distance to school (km) 13.78 8.58 -0.56 5.60 -17.93 -5.43 -0.05* -0.04 7.10 4.70 -2.73 -3.16 0.74 1.79 -0.71 -5.14 -4.91 -5.77*
[13.93] [13.11] [9.44] [8.04] [19.96] [17.42] [0.03] [0.03] [5.63] [4.99] [5.36] [4.92] [10.96] [9.78] [7.43] [6.60] [3.30] [2.97]
Days behind to latest exam 3.17 2.50 0.73 1.74 -0.74 2.91 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.57 3.12** 2.81* 1.41 -0.58 0.86 0.95 -2.38** -2.83***
[4.06] [4.01] [2.75] [2.46] [5.81] [5.33] [0.01] [0.01] [1.64] [1.53] [1.56] [1.51] [3.19] [2.99] [2.16] [2.02] [0.96] [0.91]
Constant 5187.71*** 4825.32*** -1097.37* -880.05 -206.55 -419.07 -0.59 -1.66 123.97 186.83 1032.00*** 1021.79*** 266.27 657.47 948.16* 971.66** -49.31 -4.98
[928.33] [968.45] [628.70] [593.66] [1330.15] [1286.73] [1.82] [1.86] [375.06] [368.88] [357.21] [363.71] [730.33] [722.20] [495.02] [487.44] [220.04] [219.31]
Region Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumetator Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Effect Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
0.27 0.31
R 2 0.27 0.31 0.15 0.35 0.37 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.38 0.47 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.55 0.62 0.32 0.38
No. of Obs. 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
Household Chores Playing
Computer-game
Shop Usage
Variables
Sleep
Education Labor Leisurely Activities
Study at Home Schooling (min.) Schooling (days)
Working for Fathers'
Jobs
Working for
Mothers' Jobs
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
Notes:  Numbers in brackets are the small-sample adjusted standard errors. 
Source:  Author’s calculations using the author’s surveyed data. 
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Table 4: Bivariate Probit Analysis of the Determinants of Labor Force Participations, 
Husbands (Fathers), and Wives (Mothers) 
Variables Fathers Mothers
Number of younger children 0.27 -0.31***
[0.17] [0.08]
Number of elder children -0.08 0.00
[0.06] [0.05]
Husband's education (years) 0.02 -0.02
[0.05] [0.04]
Husband's education (=1 if college graduate) 5.21*** 2.15***
[0.36] [0.48]
Husband's age -0.15*** 0.11***
[0.05] [0.03]
Husband's wage-trend indicator in labor market (=1 if increased) 5.38*** -0.49*
[0.20] [0.25]
Husband's monthly income (thousand peso) -0.06***
[0.00]
Husband working (=1) 1.34
[1.22]
Wife's age -0.01
[0.02]
Wife's education (years) 0.00
[0.05]
Wife's education (=1 if college graduate) 1.12***
[0.43]
Wife's wage-trend indicator in labor market (=1 if increased) 2.46***
[0.34]
Constant 3.28*** -1.92
[0.95] [2.17]
ρ
Log likelihood
No. of Obs.
†Wald test of error-term correlation parameter (H0: ρ=0): χ2(1)= 0.55
p -value= 0.46
-204.00
292
-0.94†
[1.27]
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are robust-standard errors. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the author’s surveyed data. 
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Table 5: Self-Reported Primary Reason of Wives (Mothers)’ Labor Force Participations 
Frequency Percent
Husband's Earning Problem: 124 86.1
Unemployment status of husband (10) (6.9)
Insufficient income earned by husband alone (114) (79.2)
I like working 16 11.1
Others 4 2.8
Total 144 100.0
Primary Reason
 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table 6: Marginal Effects of Mothers’ Labor Force Participation and Extended Family on Children Time Allocations: Full Sample 
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Boy indicator (=1) -57.73 -297.24 -111.36*** 108.45 -149.79* -140.91 -0.12 -0.27 114.16*** 348.92** -1.45 30.64 -151.22*** -302.52 206.11*** -18.54 31.63* -24.59
[57.99] [269.25] [34.91] [151.94] [85.17] [382.98] [0.12] [0.55] [30.47] [138.30] [22.20] [100.99] [45.96] [213.18] [38.60] [160.70] [17.53] [78.30]
Maternal LFP -339.28 105.82 298.06 -46.01 802.51* 151.80 0.71 0.14 -110.40 -15.71 -116.51 -68.45 -270.30 34.58 -485.82** -89.64 -202.60** -61.16
[316.19] [131.99] [190.36] [74.48] [464.43] [187.74] [0.65] [0.27] [166.14] [67.79] [121.05] [49.51] [250.63] [104.50] [210.45] [78.78] [95.57] [38.38]
Boy * Maternal LFP -59.26 -151.95 -159.73 -0.21 -180.34* 6.38 -133.21 262.49** 9.53
[191.94] [108.31] [273.00] [0.39] [98.58] [71.99] [151.97] [114.56] [55.81]
Extended family (=1) -43.44 78.42 39.39 -65.18 -237.01* -0.45** -0.38 16.99 -15.49 48.77 -69.05 79.49 12.22 127.94** 47.84 38.69 -38.39
[94.00] [154.94] [56.59] [87.43] [138.07] [0.19] [0.32] [49.39] [79.58] [35.99] [58.12] [74.51] [122.67] [62.56] [92.48] [28.41] [45.05]
Boy * Extended family -254.18 81.53 400.84 0.19 -88.53 72.25 51.86 63.45 76.97
[200.17] [112.96] [284.72] [0.41] [102.81] [75.08] [158.49] [119.47] [58.21]
Mother's LFP * Extended family -156.05 249.90** 131.09 -0.21 15.63 81.65 -20.64 30.36 29.13
[179.54] [101.31] [255.37] [0.37] [92.22] [67.34] [142.15] [107.16] [52.21]
Boy* Mother's LFP * Extended family 132.73 -100.64 -207.78 0.17 294.55** 107.24 -9.39 -135.33 -18.80
[261.19] [147.38] [371.50] [0.53] [134.15] [97.97] [206.79] [155.89] [75.95]
Other individual variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other household variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School variables No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School effect No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
R 2 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.33 0.58 0.64 0.74 0.76 0.30 0.39 0.23 0.32 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.44 0.14 0.27
No. of Obs. 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284
Variables
Sleep
Education Labor Leisurely Activities
Study at Home Schooling (min.) Schooling (days)
Working for
Fathers' Jobs
Working for
Mothers' Jobs
Household Chores Playing
Computer-game
Shop Usage
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
Notes: 1. Numbers in brackets are the small-sample adjusted standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of the other covariates that are included in Table 2 and Table 3 are made unreported for the space sake. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table 7: Marginal Effects of Mothers’ Labor Force Participation and Extended Family on Children Time Allocations: Enrolled Sample 
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Boy indicator (=1) -41.40 -427.67 -139.24*** -12.94 -209.89* -564.55 -0.13 -0.33 111.94*** 384.14** 34.13 205.22 -124.75** -422.35 198.58*** 101.71 38.56** 61.26
[79.10] [447.44] [53.61] [267.56] [112.79] [583.71] [0.15] [0.83] [31.51] [157.91] [30.32] [157.02] [60.59] [334.63] [41.92] [224.17] [18.28] [99.36]
Maternal LFP -201.50 141.47 421.77 -27.18 940.03 257.06 0.21 0.28 -119.66 -18.36 -146.23 -91.21 -200.24 21.50 -188.15 -115.44 -124.14 -16.97
[405.23] [161.20] [274.63] [96.40] [577.78] [210.30] [0.78] [0.30] [161.43] [56.89] [155.29] [56.57] [310.37] [120.56] [214.72] [80.76] [93.66] [35.80]
Boy * Maternal LFP -96.54 -268.17* -311.24 -0.25 -283.00*** -85.26 25.67 271.13** 7.09
[252.26] [150.85] [329.09] [0.47] [89.03] [88.52] [188.66] [126.38] [56.02]
Extended family (=1) 10.25 -177.61 -1.92 -79.53 -215.60 -0.36 -0.14 35.86 -34.71 44.75 -79.12 135.43 -29.55 77.72 155.71 -15.92 -115.08**
[132.10] [221.74] [89.53] [132.59] [188.35] [0.25] [0.41] [52.63] [78.26] [50.62] [77.81] [101.18] [165.83] [70.00] [111.09] [30.53] [49.24]
Boy * Extended family -33.75 47.29 703.63* 0.53 -99.79 -60.74 113.25 -141.93 122.95*
[312.71] [186.99] [407.95] [0.58] [110.36] [109.74] [233.87] [156.67] [69.44]
Mother's LFP * Extended family 183.27 249.80* -61.41 -0.80* 36.03 93.64 90.92 -72.59 85.41
[244.01] [145.91] [318.32] [0.45] [86.11] [85.63] [182.49] [122.25] [54.19]
Boy* Mother's LFP * Extended family 13.78 53.16 36.42 0.47 424.08*** 334.28*** -184.53 26.84 -158.10*
[368.71] [220.48] [481.00] [0.68] [130.12] [129.39] [275.75] [184.72] [81.88]
Other individual variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other household variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.27 0.31 0.15 0.38 0.37 0.51 0.45 0.52 0.38 0.55 0.40 0.53 0.40 0.47 0.55 0.63 0.32 0.41
No. of Obs. 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
Variables
Sleep
Education Labor Leisurely Activities
Study at Home Schooling (min.) Schooling (days)
Working for
Fathers' Jobs
Working for
Mothers' Jobs
Household Chores Playing
Computer-game
Shop Usage
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
Notes: 1. Numbers in brackets are the small-sample adjusted standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of the other covariates that are included in Table 2 and Table 3 are made unreported for the space sake. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table 8: Chi-square Statistics of Wu-Hausman Test in the 2SLS Estimations: MLFP 
Sleeping [1] 1.89 1.39 2.61 1.52
[2] 2.46 1.38 3.32 * 1.22
Studying at home [1] 2.12 3.12 * 2.92 * 3.40 *
[2] 2.95 * 3.18 * 5.35 ** 4.16 **
Schooling (in min) [1] 3.39 * 2.68 3.06 * 2.66
[2] 3.27 * 2.72 * 2.82 * 2.24
Schooling (in days) [1] 1.59 0.08 1.10 0.05
[2] 1.34 0.07 0.77 0.01
Work (fathers' jobs) [1] 0.46 0.25 0.47 0.23
[2] 0.80 0.24 0.31 0.22
Work (mothers' jobs) [1] 1.11 0.66 0.90 0.64
[2] 1.77 0.77 1.21 0.81
Household chores [1] 1.61 1.24 1.40 1.09
[2] 1.44 1.44 1.40 1.36
Playing [1] 8.12 *** 1.19 7.12 *** 1.05
[2] 8.90 *** 1.09 8.08 *** 0.87
Computer game shops [1] 4.99 ** 2.73 * 4.74 ** 3.12 *
[2] 5.21 ** 2.56 5.44 ** 3.19 *
Dependent variables Specifications§
Benchmark Models†
Models with Extended-
family variables‡
Full sample
(Table 2)
Enrolled
sample
(Table 3)
Full sample
(Table 6)
Enrolled
sample
(Table 7)
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
† “Benchmark models” correspond to those estimated in Table 2 and Table 3. 
‡ “Models with extended-family variables” correspond to those estimated in Table 6 and Table 7. The 
addition of these models is discussed in subsection C in section VI. 
§ Specifications [1] do not include and specifications [2] include some interaction terms of the boy indicator 
variable through Table 2, Table 3, Table 6, and Table 7. 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are the small-sample adjusted standard errors. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the author’s surveyed data. 
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Table 9: 2SLS First-Stage Estimators by Corresponding Specifications and Samples to the 
3SLS Models (Dependent Variable = Mothers’ Labor Force Participation) 
Second-stage Specifications 
Coef. of 
Instrument 
Robust 
S.E. 
p-value 
Stock-
Yogo F 
statistics 
Corresponding 
Specifications and 
Tables to 3SLS 
Estimators§ 
Benchmark Model†:       
 Full sample:       
  Without interaction terms 0.27*** 0.05 0.00 30.20*** Table 2 [1] 
  With interaction terms 0.17*** 0.05 0.00 12.65*** Table 2 [2] 
 Enrolled sample:       
  Without interaction terms 0.28*** 0.06 0.00 26.08*** Table 3 [1] 
  With interaction terms 0.19** 0.08 0.01 11.40*** Table 3 [2] 
Model including Extended-family variables‡       
 Full sample       
  Without interaction terms 0.28*** 0.05 0.00 35.03*** Table 6 [1] 
  With interaction terms 0.17*** 0.05 0.00 14.00*** Table 6 [2] 
 Enrolled sample       
  Without interaction terms 0.28*** 0.06 0.00 27.36*** Table 7 [1] 
    With interaction terms 0.19** 0.08 0.02 11.83*** Table 7 [2] 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
† “Benchmark models” correspond to those estimated in Table 2and Table 3. 
‡ “Models with extended-family variables” correspond to those estimated in Table 6 Table 7. The addition of 
these models is discussed in subsection C in section VI. 
§ Specifications [1] do not include and specifications [2] include some interaction terms of the male indicator 
variable through Table 2, Table 3, Table 6, and Table 7. 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are the small-sample adjusted standard errors. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the author’s surveyed data. 
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Figure 1: Female Labor Force Participation Rates (2012–16) 
 
Note: NCR = National Capital Region (Metro Manila); MIMAROPA = Region IV-B. 
Source: Table 2.10 in Gender Statistics on Labor and Employment 2017 (Philippine Statistics Authority [PSA]). 
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Figure 2: Map of the Philippines 
 
 
          [National map]                            [Provincial map] 
 
 
Notes: Circles A–I stand for the nine sampled barangays. 
Source: National map = Adapted from http://www.freemap.jp. Provincial map = Author’s own hand drawn. 
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Figure 3: Boys’ Underperformance and MLFP in Poverty-Coped Family Dynamics 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s clarification based on the results of this study. 
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APPENDIX A APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table A- 1: Demographic Contributions to Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) Population, by 
Region 
Region A Region B
Region IV-A  (CALABARZON) 17.9% Region I  (Ilocos Region) 10.7%
Region III  (Central Luzon) 14.3% Region II  (Cagayan Valley) 9.9%
Region I  (Ilocos Region) 9.7% Region VI  (Western Visayas) 6.5%
National Capital Region  (NCR) 9.7% Region III  (Central Luzon) 6.3%
Region VI  (Western Visayas) 8.9% Region XII  (SOCCSKSARGEN) 6.0%
Region II  (Cagayan Valley) 6.5% Region IV-A  (CALABARZON) 6.0%
Region VII  (Central Visayas) 5.6% Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  (ARMM) 5.9%
Region XII  (SOCCSKSARGEN) 4.7% Cordillera Administrative Region  (CAR) 5.5%
Region V  (Bicol Region) 3.7% Region V  (Bicol Region) 5.1%
Region X  (Northern Mindanao) 3.5% Region XIII  (Caraga) 4.6%
Region XI  (Davao Region) 3.3% Region X  (Northern Mindanao) 4.6%
Region IX  (Zamboanga Peninsula) 2.5% Region IX  (Zamboanga Peninsula) 4.5%
Region VIII  (Eastern Visayas) 2.2% Region VII  (Central Visayas) 4.4%
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  (ARMM) 2.1% Region IV-B (MIMAROPA) 4.1%
Region XIII  (Caraga) 1.8% Region XI  (Davao Region) 3.7%
Cordillera Administrative Region  (CAR) 1.8% Region VIII  (Eastern Visayas) 3.4%
Region IV-B (MIMAROPA) 1.8% National Capital Region  (NCR) 3.2%  
 
Notes: A = Proportion of regional OFW population to the nationally total OFW population, 2018; B = 
Proportion of the regional OFW population to each region’s production population, 2018; Production 
population = (1 − “Region’s dependency rate” ) ∗ “Region’s population” based on the National 
Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS). 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Survey on Overseas Filipinos and NDHS by the Philippine Statistics 
Authority (PSA). 
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Table A- 2: Mean Comparisons of Time-Allocation Variables (Weekly, in minutes) 
(1) (2)
Female Male
Sleeping time (mins.) 3610.8 3628.9 ≈ 3590.9 1.01
Schooling frequency† 4.3 4.7 > 3.9 1.21
Schooling time (mins.) 2114.9 2323.8 > 1884.2 1.23
Help father's job (mins.) 106.2 41.8 << 177.2 n.a.
Help mother's job (mins.) 73.5 73.6 ≈ 73.4 n.a.
Help household chores (min.) 448.2 529.8 > 358.2 1.48
Studying time at home (mins.) 278.5 343.2 > 207 1.66
Playing time (mins.) 234.2 113.1 << 367.8 0.31
Number of friends 2.6 1.7 << 3.6 0.47
Time for computer-game shop usages 53.9 34.3 << 75.6 0.45
Variables Mean (1) / (2)*
 
Notes: * “(1) / (2)” means the index of gender parity. 
    † “Schooling frequency” is the total times of going to schools during the week. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table A- 3: Descriptive Statistics of Student Score-card Performances, by 
Gender (z scores)  
Filipino 275 0.34 -0.38 0.72
Math 274 0.26 -0.30 0.56
English 274 0.40 -0.47 0.87
Science 270 0.33 -0.39 0.72
Social Studies 259 0.34 -0.38 0.72
MAPEH 269 0.32 -0.38 0.71
TLE 240 0.28 -0.35 0.63
Δ(F - M)Scores and Subjects Obs Female (F) Male (M)
 
Notes: MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health; TLE = Technology 
and Livelihood Education. 
Source: Author’s calculations using his primary data. 
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Table A- 4: Nexus between Time-Allocation Patterns and Academic Achievements 
(a) Panel A 
Filipino Math English Science
Social
Studies
MAPEH TLE
Sleeping 0.11 -0.55* -0.36 -0.26 -0.31 0.23 0.39
[0.31] [0.30] [0.31] [0.30] [0.34] [0.33] [0.37]
Education-related Activities
Studying at home 1.18*** 0.98*** 1.10*** 1.17*** 1.07*** 0.76** 1.07***
[0.34] [0.30] [0.33] [0.31] [0.34] [0.34] [0.33]
Schooling -0.63 -0.21 -0.89 0.51 0.52 0.35 0.14
[0.60] [0.53] [0.58] [0.54] [0.53] [0.62] [0.66]
Attendance (in days) 0.12 0.27 0.54 -0.56 0.02 -0.21 -0.48
[0.80] [0.68] [0.69] [0.67] [0.74] [0.83] [0.76]
Labor
Helping with fathers' jobs -1.05** -1.03*** -1.31*** -1.21*** -0.75** -0.79** -1.04**
[0.43] [0.32] [0.37] [0.35] [0.33] [0.39] [0.45]
Helping with mothers' jobs 0.20 -0.09 0.49 0.73* 0.19 0.28 0.41
[0.51] [0.31] [0.42] [0.40] [0.34] [0.31] [0.44]
Household chores -0.07 -0.38 -0.31 -0.41 -0.46 -0.23 -0.31
[0.34] [0.33] [0.38] [0.33] [0.32] [0.38] [0.35]
Leisure
Playing -1.21*** -0.92*** -1.01*** -0.95*** -1.06*** -1.24*** -1.68***
[0.38] [0.32] [0.36] [0.33] [0.37] [0.41] [0.45]
Using computer-game shops -0.20 -0.32 -0.39 -0.15 0.08 -0.13 -0.74**
[0.34] [0.35] [0.32] [0.33] [0.38] [0.42] [0.36]
Constant 85.02*** 83.93*** 85.41*** 84.03*** 84.63*** 86.91*** 85.67***
[1.41] [1.26] [1.23] [1.22] [1.67] [1.42] [1.39]
Regional effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School effect No No No No No No No
Adjusted R 2 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.14
No. of Obs. 250 249 249 245 234 246 220
Variables
 
(b) Panel B 
Filipino Math English Science
Social
Studies
MAPEH TLE
Sleeping 0.36 -0.29 -0.16 -0.08 0.01 0.29 0.48
[0.32] [0.32] [0.33] [0.34] [0.36] [0.34] [0.37]
Education-related Activities
Studying at home 1.05*** 0.85** 0.79** 1.02*** 1.06*** 0.62 1.15***
[0.39] [0.34] [0.37] [0.35] [0.39] [0.40] [0.38]
Schooling -1.08 -0.27 -1.25 0.20 0.30 -0.15 0.50
[0.68] [0.67] [0.63] [0.62] [0.63] [0.67] [0.91]
Attendance (in days) 0.69 0.51 1.10 0.37 1.13 0.54 -0.37
[0.98] [0.91] [0.81] [0.85] [0.85] [1.05] [1.12]
Labor
Helping with fathers' jobs -0.75* -0.86** -0.96** -1.06*** -0.76** -0.50 -0.72
[0.43] [0.38] [0.39] [0.35] [0.37] [0.43] [0.50]
Helping with mothers' jobs -0.01 -0.03 0.34 0.57 0.16 -0.01 0.26
[0.52] [0.31] [0.47] [0.36] [0.40] [0.30] [0.47]
Household chores -0.15 -0.30 -0.18 -0.36 -0.35 -0.11 -0.24
[0.37] [0.35] [0.41] [0.36] [0.35] [0.40] [0.39]
Leisure
Playing -1.19*** -0.82** -0.84** -0.64* -0.94** -0.99** -1.52***
[0.43] [0.36] [0.41] [0.39] [0.39] [0.43] [0.48]
Using computer-game shops -0.30 -0.65* -0.48 -0.30 -0.16 -0.38 -0.94**
[0.34] [0.35] [0.33] [0.31] [0.42] [0.42] [0.39]
Constant 83.92*** 78.12*** 84.20*** 84.14*** 81.04*** 77.08*** 93.52***
[3.58] [2.60] [3.15] [1.90] [2.38] [3.16] [1.77]
Regional effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.18
No. of Obs. 248 247 248 243 232 243 219
Variables
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
Notes: 1. Time-allocation variables are standardized into z scores.  
 2. MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health. 
3. TLE = Technology and Livelihood Education. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table A- 5: Correlation Matrix Table of Pairwise Child Time Allocations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Sleep 1.00
(2) Study at home -0.10* 1.00
(3) Schooling -0.01 0.25*** 1.00
(4) Labor: for Fathers' Job -0.06 -0.12** -0.33*** 1.00
(5) Labor: for Mothers' Job -0.02 0.04 -0.17*** 0.30*** 1.00
(6) Household Chores 0.02 0.13** -0.17*** -0.01 -0.02 1.00
(7) Playing -0.02 -0.29*** -0.35*** 0.12** 0.08 -0.19*** 1.00
(8) CGS -0.03 -0.07 -0.11** 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.12** 1.00
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10. 
Notes: 1. (3) and (4) mean the time allocated to work for fathers’ (mothers’) jobs, respectively. 
       2. (8) stands for the time allocated to use computer-game shops. 
 3. “CGS” = Using computer-game shops. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table A- 6: Decomposed Activities within Each Category 
(1) (2)
Of girls Of boys
Household chores (=1 if experienced at least once)
Young sibling caregiving 0.2 0.2 ≈ 0.2 1.00
Carry heavy materials 0.3 0.2 << 0.4 0.50
Animal caregiving 0.1 0.1 << 0.2 0.50
Cloth wash 0.5 0.6 > 0.4 1.50
Shopping daily consumables 0.1 0.1 ≈ 0.1 1.00
Cooking 0.6 0.7 > 0.5 1.40
Cleaning 0.7 0.8 > 0.5 1.60
Studying at home (=1 if did at least once)
Reviewing 0.4 0.5 > 0.3 1.67
Doing the day's homework 0.7 0.8 > 0.6 1.33
Preparing for exam 0.2 0.3 > 0.2 1.50
Doing "project" 0.4 0.3 < 0.5 0.60
Playing (weekly days of engagement)
With neighbors 1.3 0.6 << 2.0 0.30
With classmates 0.4 0.3 < 0.5 0.60
Alone 0.2 0.1 << 0.3 0.33
Online game 16.9 1.8 << 32.4 0.06
Facebook 24.3 19.5 < 29.1 0.67
Youtube 29.9 14.9 << 45.2 0.33
Chatting 11.7 8.9 < 14.6 0.61
Preparation for classes 35.7 32.6 < 38.9 0.84
Pesos spent (in peso) 35.0 26.0 < 44.3 0.59
Computer Game Shop (weekly minutes)†
Variables Means (1) / (2)*
 
Notes:  * “(1) / (2)” means the index of gender parity. 
   † Minutes of each category for computer-game shop usage can be overlapped 
and, thus, may excess the mean value that was reported in Appendix Table A- 2 
as simultaneous multi-tasks are reported. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table A- 7: Child-Own and Adult-Own Perceptions on Who Is the Most Concerned 
About the Child Issues in the Family 
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Father 39 13.8% 13.8% 44 15.5% 15.5%
Mother 220 77.7% 91.5% 234 82.7% 98.2%
Grandfather 0 0.0% 91.5% 2 0.7% 98.9%
Grandmother 1 0.4% 91.9% 1 0.4% 99.3%
Elder brother 11 3.9% 95.8% 0 0.0% 99.3%
Elder sister 9 3.2% 98.9% 0 0.0% 99.3%
Other 3 1.1% 100% 2 0.7% 100%
Total 283 100% 283 100%
Relation to children
Child-own perceptions Adult-own perceptions
 
Note: “Freq.” = frequency; “cum.” = cumulative percentage. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table A- 8: Cross Table as Matching Matrix: Child-Own and Adult-Own Perceptions on 
Who Is the Most Concerned About the Child Issues in the Family 
Father Mother Grandfather Grandmother Other Total
Child-own Percpetions
Father 17 21 0 1 0 39
Mother 24 194 2 0 0 220
Grandmother 0 1 0 0 0 1
Elder brother 1 8 0 0 2 11
Elder sister 1 8 0 0 0 9
Other 1 2 0 0 0 3
Total 44 234 2 1 2 283
Adult-own Perceptions
 
Source: Author’s calculation using the author’s primary data. 
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Table A- 9: Breakdowns of Computer-Game Shop Usages 
Activities Girls Boys Boys/Girls
Online game 2.30% 20.20% 8.78
Facebook 25.10% 18.20% 0.73
YouTube 19.20% 28.20% 1.47
Chatting 11.50% 9.10% 0.79
Preparation for classes 42.00% 24.30% 0.58
Total (mins) 77.70 160.20 2.06
 
Note:  Girls’ (boys’) percentages of the time allocated to each activity are 
calculated based on the girls’ (boys’) total minutes. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Appendix Table A- 6 (p. 49). 
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Figure A- 1: Gender Parity Index (GPI), Net Enrollment Rates, by Developing Regions 
 
(a) Elementary education 
 
 
(b) Secondary education 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (various years). 
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Figure A- 2: Gender Parity Index (GPI), Out-of-School Rates for Children and Youth, 
Elementary and Secondary School Age, by Developing Regions 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(various years). 
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Figure A- 3: Gender Parity Index (GPI), Populations by Literate Levels by Age Groups 
(Domestically in the Philippines) 
 
 
Note: “Level 0” means the literacy level of being “illiterate” and “Level 4” means the 
literacy level equivalent to the graduate level from secondary level of education, 
following the categories of the Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey 
(FLEMSS) 2013 by the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). 
Source: Author’s calculation using FLEMSS 2013, PSA. 
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Figure A- 4: Schematic Diagram of the Time Allocations as Predictors of Educational 
Achievement and their Interrelations 
Study at Home
Labor (for
fathers' jobs)
Schooling
Labor (for
mothers' jobs)
Household
Chores
Sleep Leisure (CGS)
θ
Positive partial correlation
Time constraint
Negative relation
Negative partial correlation
Educational Achievement
Leisure
(Playing)
Positive relation
 
 
Note: Magnitudes of correlations and partial correlations are not expressed. 
Source: Author’s visualization based on Appendix Table A- 3, Appendix Table A- 4, and Appendix Table A- 
5. 
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APPENDIX B SCHOOL-RELATED COVARIATES 
Some covariates regarding school-related information and the school-specific effect are 
included in the estimation for the “Enrolled Sample” shown in Table 3. These are included 
in the hope of further controlling the variations on child time-allocation patterns derived 
from covariates related to school characteristics and unobserved related heterogeneity. The 
included school variables along with the school-specific effect are the indicator of public 
school (taking the value of one if public school and zero otherwise), the commuting-mode 
indicator (taking the value of one if on foot and zero if other transportation is used), the 
house-to-school distance in kilometers, and the number of days remaining until the next 
exam based on the interview date. Regarding the last variable, the smaller the number, the 
sooner the date of the next exam. Therefore, if the sign of coefficient is negative, the time-use 
for the dependent variable increases as the exam date approaches, and vice versa. The results 
shown in Table 3 are interpreted as the marginal changes detected even after controlling for 
those school-related variables. 
 Based on the estimators of school-related variables, on average, public school 
students sleep fewer hours.1 Those who commute on foot stay in school fewer hours in a 
day (as they arrive later and/or leave earlier than those who commute by some means of 
transportation)2, and schoolchildren who travel a greater distance to attend school have 
slightly more absences. Interestingly, on average, children spend a longer time playing if 
they walk to school.3 The controlling variable for the time until an upcoming exam presents 
two interesting results: Its coefficient sign is positive for the time allocated to labor with the 
mothers’ jobs and is negative for the time spent to using computer-game shops. The former 
is straightforward; children do not contribute as much labor to their mothers’ jobs when an 
exam is coming soon. It is likely that mothers are aware the children have an exam soon and 
refrain from having their children work as much, so the children can focus on their studies. 
However, interestingly, the coefficient sign for studying time at home is statistically 
insignificant, which implies that children are not responding as their mothers may have 
intended.  
 The latter result is less straightforward because it indicates that children are more 
likely to use computer-game shops for longer periods when an exam date is coming soon. 
                                                     
1 This may be due to some special practices in public schools, e.g., in-school cleaning-up work. According 
to their reports, students need to go to school earlier for those practices although not for all public schools 
and not every day. It may be that fewer school janitors are hired in public schools than in private ones. 
2 In our research locations in Marinduque Province, students’ commuting options are either tricycles or 
jeepneys, aside from walking. The former is widely used by both elementary and high school students, while 
the latter is more commonly used by high school students. 
3 In most cases, students commute with one or more friends. On the way to and from school, they may find 
good places to play and they can easily drop in on those places while walking. In contrast, when riding on 
tricycles or jeepneys, passengers are expected to go directly to the destinations. Although passengers can 
drop off before that if they want to, it costs them an additional fare to get another ride. Those daily 
commuting fares are by no means negligible for students and their parents; in fact, students are often 
required to consider those fares as part of their “portfolios”, to be covered by an allowance they receive from 
parents (called “baon” in the Philippines). This allowance is given by parents so that students can pay for 
commuting fares, soft drinks or water, lunch and possibly snacks, and recreation if there is money leftover. 
Poor parents cannot afford to provide their children with such allowances, so the latter are likely to return 
home on foot during lunchtime and return to school on foot after lunch. 
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One possible interpretation is that the computer-game shops are places where children do 
research on the Internet. Appendix Table A- 9 presents the gender comparison of 
breakdowns of time spent on activities in computer-game shops: (i) male children use the 
computer-game shops twice as long as their female counterparts, on average; (ii) in the 
computer shops, female children use computers mostly for class preparation (research); (iii) 
male children use computers mainly for watching YouTube; (iv) boys tend to be multi-
purpose users of computer-game shops, watching YouTube, doing research on the Internet, 
and playing online games (local male children cited popular shooting games in particular); 
whereas (v) most girls seldom play online games. 
 In sum, both for male and female children, the primary role of computer-game 
shops is to provide leisure time for computer-related activities such as online games, 
Facebook, YouTube, and chatting, since over half of the time allocated to computer-game 
shops is spent in leisure activities (58% for female children and 76% for male children). 
However, computer-game shops are also used for the purpose of Internet research for 
school-related activities. Therefore, schoolchildren use computer-game shops for longer 
periods as the dates of upcoming exams approach to do online research. 
 
 
Appendix Table A- 9 around here 
